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PROHIBITIVE FAILURE: THE DEMISE OF THE
BAN ON SPORTS BETTING
John T. Holden*
ABSTRACT
On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court of the United States struck
down the federal prohibition on sports gambling. The sweeping
opinion, authored by Justice Alito, ended more than a twenty-fiveyear-old policy that kept states from offering sports gambling, which
confined sports betting almost entirely to illegal underground
markets. Indeed, the sports betting prohibition is largely responsible
for the growth of the illegal sports gambling market, which is now
one of America’s twenty largest industries. The challenge to the
federal Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act was initially
launched in 2012 when former U.S. Attorney and New Jersey
Governor, Chris Christie, signed a bill licensing sports betting at New
Jersey casinos and racetracks. Almost six years later, Governor Philip
Murphy would see New Jersey prevail at the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court decision, holding that the Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act was unconstitutional because of its
commandeering of state legislative bodies, was an impactful decision
bound to have implications across a variety of topics, ranging from
state legalization of marijuana to so-called sanctuary cities. This
article explores the origins of the Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act by detailing the political conditions that gave rise to
the statute and then examines the practicalities of the sports betting
prohibition. In the second section, this article discusses the demise of
the prohibition and its defeat at the Supreme Court. In section three,
this article elucidates the remaining obstacles to an expansion of
sports betting at the state and federal level. In section four, this article
recommends several provisions that would serve the interests of all in
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new legal markets and concludes with a brief discussion of the
broader implications of the fall of the prohibition.
INTRODUCTION
On May 14, 2018, the Supreme Court struck a fatal blow to the
federal government’s sports betting prohibition.1 The decision,
authored by Justice Alito, ended the existence of the Professional and
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA), which had, up to that point
in time, frozen sports betting laws in place for a little more than
twenty-five years.2 Some commentators had suggested that the
Supreme Court would avoid the constitutional questions raised by the
case and attempt to dispose of the matter on statutory grounds to
avoid the complex quagmire of addressing the anti-commandeering
doctrine and attempting to define the precise scope and bounds of
federal power.3 Alas, what happened was not the surgical approach
some had anticipated; rather, the Supreme Court performed surgery
with all the precision of a chainsaw, ruling that PASPA was
unconstitutional and could not be saved by simply severing the

1. See generally Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
2. See generally Eric Meer, Note, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA): A
Bad Bet for the States, 2 U. NEV. L.V. GAMING L.J. 281 (2011) (explaining that PASPA limited states’
abilities to legalize, regulate, and tax sports gambling).
3. Daniel Wallach, How the Supreme Court Could Hand a Win to New Jersey and Sports Betting,
FORBES (Dec. 11, 2017, 7:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/danielwallach/2017/12/11/supremecourt-ncaa-christie-nj-betting [https://perma.cc/XUB4-JSJK] (“One way for the Supreme Court to
resolve this conundrum—in keeping with the [C]ourt’s longstanding preference for interpreting statutes
in a manner that would avoid ‘constitutional difficulties’—would be to decide the case on the purely
statutory grounds suggested by Justices Gorsuch and Sotomayor. Under this approach, the [C]ourt could
sidestep the severability quagmire and conclude simply that New Jersey’s partial repeal law does not
rise to the level of an authorization under PASPA.”). Others have suggested that the
anti-commandeering doctrine “has no basis in the text or history of the [Constitution].” Steven Schwinn,
Symposium: It’s Time to Abandon Anti-Commandeering (but Don’t Count on This Supreme Court to Do
It), SCOTUSBLOG (Aug. 17, 2017, 10:44 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/08/symposium-timeabandon-anti-commandeering-dont-count-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/9SB3-QYBD] (arguing that
the Constitution does not support the anti-commandeering doctrine and actually advocates the opposite,
and pointing out that “[f]or example, the supremacy clause makes the Constitution and federal laws
supreme over state constitutions and state laws; it also binds state judges to the Constitution and federal
law. The oath clause requires state legislators and state executive officers to swear an oath to support the
federal Constitution, but doesn’t reciprocally require federal officers to swear an oath to support the
states.”).
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constitutionally offensive language.4 Although the majority’s
decision was sweeping, Justice Thomas argued in a concurring
opinion that not only does PASPA exceed congressional authority, it
also raises doubts as to a broader question of federalism, namely
Congress’s ability to regulate sports gambling that does not cross
state lines.5 Like many other prohibitions that came before it, the
prohibition on sports betting was an abject failure.6
The prohibition on alcohol, which Congress passed just before the
end of 1917 and ratified on January 16, 1919, was likely America’s
most committed and prominent prohibition.7 The push for prohibition
began decades earlier, led by Hillsboro, Ohio housewife Eliza
Thompson, who began a nationwide crusade against alcohol.8 The
calls for prohibition began to mount, and by the early twentieth
century the Anti-Saloon League had gained sufficient power to
become a force to be reckoned with.9 By 1916, the Anti-Saloon
League had used its influence to “effectively seize[ ] control of both
the House and Senate,” becoming the driving force behind what
would motivate Congress to pass what would become the Eighteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, banning the sale of
intoxicating beverages in the United States.10 The economic drivers
of prohibition were based on the idea that there would be a
substitution effect if alcohol was banned.11 The idea put forth by
legislators and advocates was that prohibition would shift spending
from alcohol to items such as life insurance, food, shelter, and
4. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1482. The Supreme Court held that to find the whole statute
unconstitutional, as opposed to individual sections, it was necessary to show “‘[Congress] would not
have enacted those provisions which are within its power, independently of [those] which [are] not.’” Id.
(quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987)).
5. Id. at 1485 (Thomas, J., concurring).
6. See John T. Holden, Sports Betting and Booze: A Tale of Two Prohibitions, SPORTS HANDLE
(May 22, 2018, 10:00 AM), https://sportshandle.com/sports-betting-and-booze-a-tale-of-twoprohibitions [https://perma.cc/34J4-3CC5].
7. Id. (describing the histories and impacts of the United States’s experiment with alcohol
prohibition and the sports gambling prohibition of PASPA and drawing parallels between the two
prohibitions).
8. DANIEL OKRENT, LAST CALL: THE RISE AND FALL OF PROHIBITION 13–14 (2010).
9. Id. at 129.
10. Id. at 131.
11. MARK THORNTON, THE ECONOMICS OF PROHIBITION 58 (1991).
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savings.12 The alcohol prohibition was a substantial failure.13 Not
only did the practice not result in additional spending on food and
shelter, but also beer consumption increased during prohibition, and
the consumption levels of pure alcohol remained relatively stable
throughout the era.14 The Amendment’s prohibition failed miserably
in achieving its purpose because it simply forced bootleggers to
improvise, often creating concoctions with far more alcohol than
typical alcoholic beverages, rendering them much more dangerous.15
The prohibition against alcohol ended on December 5, 1933, with the
ratification of the Twenty First Amendment.16 Prohibition lasted little
more than a decade cost an estimated $11 billion in lost tax revenues
as a result of prohibited liquor being sold outside the realm of
taxation.17 The lost tax revenue was compounded by the $300 million
spent on enforcement of Prohibition.18 The failure of the prohibition
of alcohol would manifest yet again in the federal government’s
“War on Drugs.”
The War on Drugs’ most controversial target has been marijuana,19
especially since the rise of the medical marijuana industry, which
began with California passing Proposition 215 in 1996.20 Marijuana
in the United States has been illegal at the federal level since the
passage of the Marijuana Tax Act in 1937.21 Although illegal since
before World War II, large expenditures on policing the drug did not
escalate until the late 1960s.22 As enforcement expenditures rose, so
12. Id. at 72.
13. Id. at 127.
14. Id. at 102.
15. Id. at 103–05.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
17. Holden, supra note 6.
18. Id.
19. Ashley C. Bradford & W. David Bradford, Why Jeff Sessions Is Going to Lose His War Against
Cannabis,
WASH.
POST
(Aug.
1,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/08/01/why-jeff-sessions-is-going-tolose-his-war-against-cannabis/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.0262c9e7894a
[https://perma.cc/QYN3F9UK].
20. State Medical Marijuana Laws, NAT’L CONFERENCE STATE LEGISLATURES (Oct. 17, 2018),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/state-medical-marijuana-laws.aspx
[https://perma.cc/9GMSCBDQ].
21. THORNTON, supra note 11, at 105.
22. Id. at 108.
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did the potency of the drug; like during the alcohol prohibition era,
providers sought to increase the potency so that there was less drug
needed to achieve the same result, effectively maintaining a similar
level of risk.23 The marijuana prohibition, however, is slowly being
dismantled on a state-by-state basis.24 Indeed, there has been an
ongoing litigious debate between the federal government and state
lawmakers over who should bear the cost of federal marijuana
enforcement in states that have repealed their prohibitions.25 The
debate over state power to legalize marijuana for both medicinal and
recreational purposes continues, but the federal government does not
yet appear ready to totally abandon the enforcement of its own
criminal laws against cannabis growers and sellers, despite a stated
policy shift in enforcement priorities.26 Unlike the prohibition against
alcohol, the federal marijuana prohibition appears to be eroding by
slow decay, as opposed to the democratic death of its predecessor.27
Sports betting, however, is the most recent prohibition to meet its
end, and, unlike marijuana and alcohol, the courts ended this
prohibition.28
23. Id. at 89, 99.
24. See Kevin Litman-Navarro, Marijuana Legalization 2018: A State-by-State Guide to Legal
Weed, INVERSE (Apr. 18, 2018), http://www.inverse.com/article/43850-marijuana-legal-weed-states-in2018 [https://perma.cc/PM3Y-8YPD]. By 2018, thirty states had legalized medical marijuana. German
Lopez,
Marijuana
Is
Legal
for
Medical
Purposes
in
30
States,
VOX,
http://www.vox.com/cards/marijuana-legalization/what-is-medical-marijuana [https://perma.cc/D3XETK8R] (last updated Aug. 20, 2018, 12:07 PM). In addition to the thirty states that have legalized
medical marijuana, Alaska, California, Colorado, Maine, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oregon, Vermont,
Washington, and the District of Columbia have all legalized marijuana for recreational use. LitmanNavarro, supra.
25. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 646 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring) (“That patients
may be more likely to violate federal law if the additional deterrent of state liability is removed may
worry the federal government, but the proper response—according to New York and Printz—is to
ratchet up the federal regulatory regime, not to commandeer that of the state.”).
26. See Evan Halper, Trump Administration Abandons Crackdown on Legal Marijuana, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 13, 2018, 3:25 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-marijuana-trump-20180413story.html [https://perma.cc/Z4DZ-RTX9]. The April 2018 announcement from the Trump
Administration reversed a January 2018 Justice Department memorandum that rescinded guidance
documents issued by the Obama Administration regarding lax prosecutorial policies towards enforcing
criminal laws insofar as they related to marijuana in states that had legalized the drug. Memorandum
from Jefferson B. Sessions, III, Att’y Gen., on Marijuana Enforcement to All U.S. Att’ys (Jan. 4, 2018),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/1022196/download [https://perma.cc/7NAS-KJ96].
27. Halper, supra note 26.
28. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1484–85 (2018).
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The modern prohibition against sports betting dates to the early
1950s29 and the emergence of the Special Committee on Organized
Crime in Interstate Commerce’s (Kefauver Committee) final report,
which noted that organized crime figures used wire transmissions to
convey bookmaking information across the country.30 The primary
fixation of early modern sports gambling laws was less on sports
gambling itself as a vice, but on sports gambling as a means of
revenue generation for organized crime.31 Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy had estimated that organized crime’s illegal gambling
business surpassed a value of $7 billion in 1961.32 Kennedy made
clear that it was not the intent of the federal government to target all
29. S. REP. NO. 82-725, at 13 (1951). There were federal and state prohibitions on sports wagering
prior to the 1950s and 1960s, but many of these statutes were never modernized to address
contemporary criminal organizations. Id.
30. Special Committee on Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, U.S. SENATE,
https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/investigations/Kefauver.htm
[https://perma.cc/EX7E-5XBK]. Senate Resolution 202 established the Special Committee on
Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce. Id. The Committee, led by Representative Estes Kefauver of
Tennessee, launched a fourteen-city tour of the country over fifteen months. Id. The Committee held
televised hearings, which included testimony from organized crime figures such as Frank Costello. Id.
This marked the first time that many Americans had ever seen the faces or heard mafia members speak.
Id. The Kefauver Committee, in its final report, produced a recommendation for passage of what would
become the Federal Wire Act, stating:
S. 1564 reflects the committee’s recognition that the ultimate effects of S. 1563
may be delayed by hearings, appeals and court tests, the initial weakness of any
administrative device, and it therefore strikes straight at the source of the
bookmakers’ information with a narrow criminal prohibition. The proprietors of
almost all legitimate race tracks and sports events have long been fighting the
wire-service operators, by denying them the right to send out their bulletins on
betting odds, scratches, times, results, etc. Consequently the operators have been
driven to elaborate subterfuge, sometimes stealing the information from blinds
outside the track or enclosure, sometimes using wig-wag signals, semaphores,
special codes, and even walkie-talkie radio equipment from inside. S. 1564
would make it a Federal crime for any person to transmit in interstate commerce
gambling information “obtained surreptitiously or through stealth and without
the permission of” the proprietor of the event, when such information is intended
to be used for illegal gambling purposes. It is believed that this measure would
be effective at once to stop the flow of such information, and thus to cripple the
wire services before they are brought completely in hand by regulation under the
FCC.
S. REP. NO. 82-725, supra note 29, at 89.
31. H.R. REP. NO. 87-967, at 2631 (1961).
32. The Attorney General’s Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering: Hearing on S.
1653, S. 1654, S. 1655, S. 1656, S. 1657, S. 1658, and S. 1665 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
87th Cong. 5 (1961) (“Gambling in the United States, we estimate, involves about 70,000 persons and a
gross volume of $7 billion annually.”).

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss2/3

6

Holden: Prohibitive Failure: The Demise of the Ban on Sports Betting

2019]

PROHIBITIVE FAILURE

335

sports bettors; to the contrary, the bill was only intended to target
professional bettors. The Attorney General sought to avoid a situation
where a bettor could escape the scope of the statute by claiming “I
just like to bet. I just make social wagers.”33 The Wire Act, which
would become law on September 13, 1961, would serve as the lone
federal statute to explicitly address bets and wagers on sporting
events until the passage of PASPA in 1992.34
Among the pushes for the enactment of PASPA, scholars cite
continued pressure to reinforce existing laws protecting against
organized crime and the potential for an increase in match-fixing in a
world where sports betting was not prohibited.35 By 1989, it was
estimated that more than $29.5 billion was being wagered illegally,
and federal lawmakers and sports leagues began to express concerns
that states would seek to recapture some of the illegal market share
by legalizing sports gambling themselves.36 Senator Bill Bradley
wrote a law review article in which he detailed that “one million of
the eight million compulsive gamblers in this country are teenagers,”
and their activity of choice is sports betting.37 The argument that
state-sanctioned sports betting would exacerbate gambling addictions
was prominent in the early 1990s.38 These fears, along with fears of
33. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, PROHIBITING TRANSMISSION OF BETS BY WIRE COMMUNICATIONS, S.
REP. NO. 588, at 3 (1st Sess. 1961). Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy stated that the bill “is not
interested in the casual dissemination of information with respect to football, baseball or other sporting
events between acquaintances.” Id.
34. Interstate Wire Act of 1961, 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2018) (“Whoever being engaged in the
business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a wire communication facility for the transmission in
interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or
wagers on any sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which entitles
the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for information assisting in the
placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than two years, or
both.”). During the years after the Act’s passage, Congress passed other pieces of antigambling
legislation, which certainly impacted sports wagering involving human participants, but no bill
specifically addressed the activity. See, e.g., Interstate Horseracing Act of 1978, 15 U.S.C. §§ 3001–07;
Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, 18 U.S.C. § 1955; Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25 U.S.C.
§§ 2701–09, 2711–21 (2018); 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994) (invalidated by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v.
Florida, 517 U.S. § 44 (1996)).
35. James H. Frey, Gambling on Sport: Policy Issues, 8 J. GAMBLING STUD. 351, 351–52 (1992).
36. Id. at 353.
37. Bill Bradley, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act–Policy Concerns Behind
Senate Bill 474, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 5, 7 (1992).
38. Id.
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rising societal costs, were the locomotives driving the crusade of
Congress against state-sanctioned sports betting.39
PASPA was a disaster for more than twenty-five years.40 The
statute did not prohibit sports wagering; instead, it prohibited the
state sanctioning of sports wagering in states that did not already
offer sports betting prior to its passage.41 This policy decision
effectively conveyed a monopoly to Nevada and ensured that illegal
bookmakers did not have to fear losing their clients to the legal
market.42 PASPA served as an incubator for illegal sports gambling
with the internet acting as fertilizer.43 By 2017, estimates placed the
size of the illegal sports betting market at $150 billion annually.44
PASPA was unsuccessful and, as the Supreme Court declared,

39. Id. at 6.
40. Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1478 (2018).
41. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2012), invalidated by Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
42. See Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Sports Betting Has an Equal Sovereignty Problem,
67 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 1, 4 (2017). Although PASPA is frequently discussed as exempting Nevada,
Delaware, Oregon, and Montana, all of which offered some forms of sports wagering products, only
Nevada offered full-scale sports wagering. Id. at 34. Additionally, there are at least a handful of other
states that had laws permitting limited forms of sports betting. See Nebraska County and City Lottery
Act, NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 9-601, -602 (2018) (“The purpose of the [act] is to allow any county, city, or
village to conduct a lottery for community betterment purposes. Any lottery conducted by a county, city,
or village shall be conducted only by those methods and under those circumstances prescribed in the act.
No other form or method shall be authorized or allowed.”); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.46.0335
(2018) (“The legislature hereby authorizes any person, association, or organization to conduct sports
pools without a license to do so from the commission but only when the outcome of which is dependent
upon the score, or scores, of a certain athletic contest and which is conducted only in the following
manner: (1) A board or piece of paper is divided into one hundred equal squares, each of which
constitutes a chance to win in the sports pool and each of which is offered directly to prospective
contestants at one dollar or less; (2) The purchaser of each chance or square signs his or her name on the
face of each square or chance he or she purchases; and (3) At some time not later than prior to the start
of the subject athletic contest the pool is closed and no further chances in the pool are sold; (4) After the
pool is closed a prospective score is assigned by random drawing to each square; (5) All money paid by
entrants to enter the pool less taxes is paid out as the prize or prizes to those persons holding squares
assigned the winning score or scores from the subject athletic contest; (6) The sports pool board is
available for inspection by any person purchasing a chance thereon, the commission, or by any law
enforcement agency upon demand at all times prior to the payment of the prize; (7) The person or
organization conducting the pool is conducting no other sports pool on the same athletic event; and (8)
The sports pool conforms to any rules and regulations of the commission applicable thereto.”).
43. Rodenberg & Holden, supra note 42, at 34.
44. AM. SPORTS BETTING COAL., The Sports Betting Opportunity: New Research Shows Legalized
Sports Betting Will Generate Economic Growth, American Jobs and Tax Revenues, AM. GAMING ASS’N
(Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/sidebar_file/8.31.17.Oxford.pdf
[https://perma.cc/L6GZ-UHKN].
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unconstitutional.45 Although PASPA no longer exists, widespread
legal sports betting continues to face a number of obstacles.
This article contains four parts. Part I examines the emergence of
PASPA and the evolution of the statute in the early 1990s. Part II
discusses the roughly twenty-five-year history of the statute and the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Murphy v. NCAA, which brought
an abrupt end to the statute’s existence. In Part III, this article
discusses what obstacles remain in the way of widespread wagering,
including challenges at the federal, state, and private operator levels.
Finally, in Part IV, this article provides some recommendations for
best practices in the new legal market.
I. The Rise of PASPA
The conception of PASPA was not as a criminal law or civil
prohibition, but instead a proposal to amend the Lanham Act.46
Professional sports leagues drove the campaign to stop the spread of
state-sanctioned sports gambling and argued that federal legislation
was necessary to protect the integrity of professional and amateur
sporting events.47 The sports leagues professed an interest in
preserving the innocence of American youth and the integrity of the
game.48 The concerns about the integrity of the game were
overshadowed by concerns about purported intellectual property

45. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1479.
46. Legislation Prohibiting State Lotteries from Misappropriating Professional Sports Service
Marks: Hearing on S. 1772 Before the Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 37 (1990) [hereinafter Initial PASPA Hearing] (statement of Sen. Harry
Reid) (recording the title of S. 1772 as “[a] bill to amend the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946 to protect
the service marks of professional sports organizations from misappropriation by State lotteries”).
47. Thomas J. Ostertag, From Shoeless Joe to Charley Hustle: Major League Baseball’s Continued
Crusade Against Sports Gambling, 2 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 19, 21 (1992) (“In addition to
aggressively and jointly lobbying Congress, in conjunction with the other professional and amateur
sports organizations, Major League Baseball (MLB) has lodged a concerted grass-roots campaign
against the legalization of state-sanctioned and state-authorized sports gambling enterprises. This
campaign is aimed at preserving the integrity of our sports contests, preserving the image of its athletes
as role models for our nation’s youth, and preventing the deleterious effects that sports gambling would
have upon the youth of America.”) (citing Hearing on H.R. 74 Before the Subcomm. on Econ. and
Commercial Law, 102d Cong. 165 (1991)).
48. Id. at 24.
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rights in sporting events raised during the initial hearings on the
legislation that would become PASPA.49
A. 1990: Legislation Prohibiting State Lotteries from
Misappropriating Professional Sports Service Marks
The first hearing on the legislation that would become PASPA
took place on June 26, 1991, before the Senate Judiciary
Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks.50 Senator
Dennis DeConcini of Arizona, who called for the gathering, opened
the hearing by stating: “The Sports Service Protection Act is a very
important piece of legislation . . . .”51 At the time, numerous states
were considering offering sports lotteries.52 The perception in
Congress was that the professional sports leagues had worked hard to
portray a wholesome image to fans and that sports betting would be
deleterious to this goodwill.53 Further driving home the perceived
need for the legislation in his opening statement, Senator DeConcini
stated that legalized sports betting would result in an overall increase
in wagering activity.54
49. Ryan M. Rodenberg, Anastasios Kaburakis & John T. Holden, “Whose” Game Is It? SportsWagering and Intellectual Property, 60 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE LEGE 1, 2–6 (2014). Unlike sports
broadcasts, which can be copyrighted, sporting events themselves enjoy no such protection. Id. at 4; see
also Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 847 (2d Cir. 1997) (“We believe that the lack of
caselaw is attributable to a general understanding that athletic events were, and are, uncopyrightable.
Indeed, prior to 1976, there was even doubt that broadcasts describing or depicting such events, which
have a far stronger case for copyrightability than the events themselves, were entitled to copyright
protection. Indeed, as described in the next subsection of this opinion, Congress found it necessary to
extend such protection to recorded broadcasts of live events. The fact that Congress did not extend such
protection to the events themselves confirms our view that the district court correctly held that
appellants were not infringing a copyright in the NBA games.”); Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 26, Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13461), 2014 WL 828079, at *26 (“[W]hen a television network broadcasts a live sporting event, no
underlying performance precedes the initial transmission—the telecast itself is the only copyrighted
work.”).
50. Initial PASPA Hearing, supra note 46.
51. Id. at 1 (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini).
52. Id. Sports lotteries are effectively pools where players bet on the outcomes of sporting events,
and, although often done via pari-mutuel wagering, this is not always the case. Sports Lottery,
CASINOPEDIA, http://www.casinopedia.org/terms/s/sports-lottery [https://perma.cc/C9GY-7QLS] (last
visited Oct. 11, 2018).
53. See Initial PASPA Hearing, supra note 46, at 2 (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini).
54. Id. This position is one that persists, though others have argued that there may instead be a
substitution effect, as opposed to a net increase, whereby bettors either move to legal markets from
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Senator Richard Bryan of Nevada followed the testimony of
Senator DeConcini and testified that he supported the proposed
legislation, provided that the proposed regulations did not affect
Nevada’s sports betting regulatory structure.55 This concern for
Nevada’s sports betting monopoly would become realized when
Representative John Bryant from the House of Representatives would
testify, immediately following Senator Bryan, that a companion
House bill would inadvertently criminalize gambling in Nevada.56
The Representative from Texas stated that “wherever gambling
becomes a principal concern, sports have a tendency to become
corrupt.”57 This theme was echoed when Reggie Williams, a former
National Football League (NFL) linebacker and Cincinnati city
councilman, testified that “[s]tate-sponsored gambling really would
make a mockery of an athlete’s sacrifices and commitments.”58
Williams stated that if legalized betting existed, he would be
suspicious of a teammate who smiled after losing a game on the
field.59 Legalized sports betting would mean that athletes could no
longer be role models and children would collect lottery tickets
instead of baseball cards.60 Although not articulated during his
testimony that he was appearing on behalf of the NFL, Williams later
responded to additional questions on NFL letterhead, stating that it
was his belief that legalized betting might increase the likelihood of
games being fixed.61

illegal markets or bettors choose to wager on sports versus other gambling activities such as horse
racing. See Michael Baumann, The Downsides of Legalized Sports Gambling, RINGER (May 15, 2018,
10:56
AM),
http://www.theringer.com/sports/2018/5/15/17355544/downsides-sports-gamblinglegalization-ncaa-marijuana [https://perma.cc/F93E-VVSK].
55. Initial PASPA Hearing, supra note 46, at 13 (statement of Sen. Richard H. Bryan). Later,
Senator Bryan played an instrumental role in the exemption of fantasy sports from the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act, which led to the rise of the daily fantasy sports industry, one of the
indicators of a societal shift in terms of attitudes towards sports gambling. John T. Holden, The
Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act and the Exemption for Fantasy Sports, 28 J. LEGAL
ASPECTS SPORT 97, 103, 109 (2018).
56. Initial PASPA Hearing, supra note 46, at 14 (statement of Sen. John Bryant).
57. Id. at 16.
58. Id. at 23 (statement of Reggie Williams, Former Linebacker, Cincinnati Bengals).
59. Id. at 24.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 29.
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Following Williams’s testimony, Jeff Ballard, a pitcher for the
Baltimore Orioles, spoke.62 Ballard testified that state-sponsored
gambling might lead to “shaving runs or even fixing the outcome of
the games.”63 Both Ballard and Williams informed the Subcommittee
that legalized sports betting may cause threats to the integrity of the
games they played, but Ballard specifically noted that in all his years
of being a professional athlete he had not heard any talk of the Las
Vegas point spreads in the locker room.64
NFL Commissioner Paul Tagliabue testified that state-sanctioned
sports gambling sends a negative message to the youth of the
country.65 Tagliabue asserted that state-sponsored betting games
“misappropriated” sports league property, likening it to a state
manufacturing Donald Duck or Mickey Mouse dolls.66 In response to
additional questions submitted by Senator Grassley, Tagliabue
asserted that the NFL had never taken legal action against casinos in
Nevada that use NFL logos and team names.67 The lack of any such

62. Initial PASPA Hearing, supra note 46, at 32 (statement of Jeff Ballard, Pitcher, Baltimore
Orioles).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 24, 33 (statements of Reggie Williams, Former Linebacker, Cincinnati Bengals, and Jeff
Ballard, Pitcher, Baltimore Orioles).
65. Id. at 39 (statement of Paul Tagliabue, Comm’r, National Football League).
66. Id. The suggestion that sports betting misappropriates sports leagues’ property is a theme that has
recently reemerged. See Adam Candee, NBA’s Adam Silver on Sports Betting: ‘The Integrity Fee Is
Something We Are Entitled to,’ LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (June 1, 2018, 2:40 PM),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/20904/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-talks-sports-betting
[https://perma.cc/6D77-Y8SH] (statement of Adam Silver, Comm’r, National Basketball Association)
(“‘We think the integrity fee is something that we are entitled to, one, because we have the additional
costs and also—something that as I’ve said before, we’re not hiding from—that we also think we are
due a royalty. And that if the intellectual property that is created by this league—and I know all the
leagues support this position, but in the case of the NBA, we will spend roughly $7.5 billion creating
NBA basketball this season.’”); David Waldstein, Rob Manfred Addresses the Shift, Gambling and That
Viral
Terry
Collins
Video,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
14,
2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/14/sports/baseball/rob-manfred-shift-gambling-expansion.html
[https://perma.cc/V84D-QTL2] (quoting Rob Manfred, Comm’r, Major League Baseball) (“‘From our
perspective, we see revenue opportunities, but most important, we see it as an opportunity for fan
engagement,’ [Manfred] said, adding that baseball wants it done in a way that, ‘first and foremost
protects the integrity of the game—but, equally important, protects [Major League Baseball’s]
intellectual property.’”).
67. Initial PASPA Hearing, supra note 46, at 55 (statement of Paul Tagliabue, Comm’r, National
Football League).
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legal action likely suggests that the NFL was fishing for an
intellectual property grant from Congress.68
Major League Baseball (MLB) Deputy Commissioner Stephen
Greenberg reiterated the other sports league representatives’
objections, suggesting that increases in state-sponsored sports
gambling would increase the likelihood that games will be subjected
to attempted manipulation.69 Richard Hilliard, the Director of
Enforcement for the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA), testified that the NCAA would support any legislative
initiative to limit opportunities for individuals to gamble on the
outcome of NCAA games.70 Despite Hilliard’s endorsement, he
noted that the NCAA possesses no “hard” evidence that organized
crime has attempted to infiltrate college basketball through the sale of
drugs, which could leave athletes vulnerable to extortion.71 Gary
Bettman, who appeared on behalf of the National Basketball
Association (NBA), testified that “[b]etting creates point spread
fans,” who are fans that no longer care about their team, but instead
are cheering to win a bet.72 Bettman also suggested that “[t]he
Federal antilottery statute, in section 1307, seems to expressly
prohibit sports betting.”73 However, Bettman conceded that the courts
had failed to agree with his interpretation.74 Senator Ted Kennedy
asked Bettman whether it was true that NBA teams have accepted
millions of dollars in advertising fees from state-sanctioned lotteries.
In response, Bettman maintained that the NBA’s position was that
68. See Lorenzo Reyes, Roger Goodell, NFL Ask Congress for ‘Uniform Standards’ on Sports
Betting,
USA
TODAY
(May
21,
2018,
12:04
PM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nfl/2018/05/21/nfl-betting-gambling-congress-rogergoodell/628697002/ [https://perma.cc/X6QS-7JS6]; see also Ryan M. Rodenberg, John T. Holden &
Asa D. Brown, Real-Time Sports Data and the First Amendment, 11 WASH. J.L., TECH. & ARTS 63, 86
(2015).
69. See Initial PASPA Hearing, supra note 46, at 62–63 (statement of Stephen Greenberg, Deputy
Director, Major League Baseball).
70. Id. at 70 (statement of Richard Hilliard, Director of Enforcement, National Collegiate Athletic
Association).
71. Id. at 73.
72. Id. at 76 (statement of Gary Bettman, Senior Vice President & General Counsel, National
Basketball Association).
73. Id. at 77.
74. Id.
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there is a clear distinction between accepting money from lotteries
with traditional lottery games and approving of sports wagering.75
Harvard law professor Arthur Miller appeared on behalf of the
NFL to testify before the Senate Subcommittee.76 Miller specifically
focused his testimony on what he described as the misappropriation
of “good will and values.”77 Professor Miller informed the committee
that state-sponsored lotteries would take the values that were crafted
by the sports leagues and would alter them.78 Miller further asserted
that the current state of the law was inadequate to protect the leagues
under the existing Lanham Act.79 According to Miller, there would
be an insufficient remedy to the sports leagues with the legislation
that was the subject of the hearing despite the existing protections of
the Lanham Act.80
Professor Miller advocated for changes to intellectual property
laws in favor of the uniqueness of the sports leagues’ products, but
Garo Partoyan of the United States Trademark Association testified
that the organization opposed the new proposed regulations because
they would tarnish the uniformity, balance, and “essential fairness”
of the Lanham Act.81 Partoyan detailed numerous alternatives that
would not result in an alteration and special privileges being afforded
under the proposed legislation.82 Partoyan’s message may have
resonated with Congress, as the 1990 hearing was the last time
legislators proposed amendments to the Lanham Act in regard to
sports betting.
By September 1990, the efforts to stop the expansion of statesponsored sports lotteries had transitioned from an intellectual
75. Initial PASPA Hearing, supra note 46, at 92.
76. Id. at 251 (statement of Arthur R. Miller, Bruce Bromley Professor of Law, Harvard Law
School).
77. Id. at 252.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 253. Indeed, Miller’s argument that under existing interpretations of the Lanham Act the
statute was insufficient to provide protections to the sports leagues is perhaps ironic, given sports
leagues’ current assertions that they already possess an enforceable intellectual property right. See Initial
PASPA Hearing, supra note 46, at 253.
81. Id. at 263 (statement of Garo Partoyan, President, United States Trademark Association).
82. Id. at 264.
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property issue to a criminal law issue with a proposed amendment as
part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1990.83 The first of
three hearings had several key themes emerge, including sports
league executives seeking to have Congress bestow a right in the
league’s games to them.84 The testimony of sports league executives
was also one of the first occasions that where organization leaders
began to push for a right to control how facts associated with how
their games were used by third-parties.85 This theme remains
pervasive more than two decades later.
B. 1991: Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling
The second hearing on legislation that became PASPA took place
before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and
Trademarks on June 26, 1991.86 The hearing included testimony on
two separate bills, the first was titled: “A Bill to Amend the Lanham
Trademark Act of 1946 to Protect the Service Marks of Professional
and Amateur Sports Organizations from Misappropriation by State
Lotteries”; and the second was titled: “A Bill to Prohibit Sports
Gambling Under State Law.”87 The two bills were a transition from
the hearing in the previous year because, for the first time, Congress
recognized the challenge in addressing sports gambling proliferation
and managing the allocation of resources to enforce a new gambling
statute.88
83. H.R. REP. NO. 101-681, pt. 1, at 192 (1990) (“[A] [s]tate-sponsored lottery based on sporting
events will undermine public confidence in the integrity of the sports involved, place undue pressure on
players and coaches, and communicate negative values about sports to the youth of America. The stamp
of approval that government would put upon such a lottery by sponsoring it could encourage a broad
section of the population to participate in an activity that is much more than a mere game of chance.”).
84. See id.
85. See
Sports
Betting
Integrity
Fee,
LEGAL
SPORTS
REPORT,
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/integrity-fee [https://perma.cc/6YZP-YRZC] (last visited Oct. 11,
2018); Brett Smiley, U.S. Sports Betting in 2018: Timeline of State and Sportsbook Developments,
SPORTS HANDLE (July 2, 2018, 4:30 PM), https://sportshandle.com/us-sports-betting-in-2018-timelineof-state-and-sportsbook-developments [https://perma.cc/KBG6-F75U].
86. Prohibiting State-Sanctioned Sports Gambling: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Patents,
Copyrights and Trademarks of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Second
PASPA Hearing].
87. Id.
88. John T. Holden, Anastasios Kaburakis & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Commentary, Occam’s Razor and
Sports Wagering Law, HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. ONLINE DIG. 1, 3 (Jan. 25, 2015),
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Once again, Senator DeConcini delivered the opening statement in
the second PASPA hearing as he had during the first hearing.89
DeConcini noted that S. 473, the service mark bill, was the same as
was debated in the previous Congress, but S. 474 was described as “a
broader approach to the problem of sports gambling and is the
byproduct of information provided during last year’s hearing.”90 The
Arizona senator argued that there were limits to the strategies states
utilized to raise money, stating: “I do not believe the answers to
budgetary problems should be to increase the number of lottery
players or sports bettors.”91
The first witness to testify in the June 1991 hearing was Senator
Bill Bradley of New Jersey.92 Bradley, a former NBA player, noted
that the $100 billion sports gambling industry appears attractive to
states that are cash-strapped.93 Senator Bradley testified that there
were eight million gambling addicts in the United States and one
million were teenagers.94 Bradley stressed that it was his opinion that
legal gambling would likely increase illegal gambling, creating “an
atmosphere that invites corruption.”95 The hypothesized idea was that
legalized gambling was likely to shift the focus of the game from
being about the skill of the athletes to being about beating point
spreads.96 Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, who testified immediately

http://www.harvardjsel.com/2015/01/occams-razor-and-sports-wagering-law [https://perma.cc/C47GYG6V]. One of PASPA’s unique features was that it enabled professional and amateur sports leagues to
enforce the statute on their own. Id. Under previous conceptions of property rights, this would appear to
be problematic because the leagues have only an indirect connection with the information used by
sportsbooks. Id; Anastasios Kaburakis, Ryan M. Rodenberg & John T. Holden, Inevitable: Sports
Gambling, State Regulation, and the Pursuit of Revenue, 5 HARV. BUS. L. REV. ONLINE 27 at 1, 3 (Jan.
10, 2015).
89. Second PASPA Hearing, supra note 86, at 1 (statement of Sen. Dennis DeConcini).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 3.
92. Id. at 10. Bradley would later publish a book titled Values of the Game, though the book makes
no reference to gambling or his crusade for the passage of PASPA. See BILL BRADLEY, VALUES OF THE
GAME (1998).
93. Second PASPA Hearing, supra note 86, at 10 (statement of Sen. Bill Bradley).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 12.

https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol35/iss2/3

16

Holden: Prohibitive Failure: The Demise of the Ban on Sports Betting

2019]

PROHIBITIVE FAILURE

345

after Bradley, echoed Bradley’s view that legalized gambling would
increase the size of the illegal gambling market.97
Senator Chuck Grassley of Iowa challenged Senator Bradley,
arguing that the professional sports leagues have seemingly
acquiesced to gambling on sports using team logos in Nevada’s
casinos.98 Grassley stated that he was “curious” as to why the focus
was placed on state-sponsored lotteries when the vast majority of
gambling takes place outside of regulated markets.99 Grassley’s
comments were among the few voices questioning the efficacy of the
proposed legislation.100 Grassley’s skepticism, however, did not deter
the onslaught of war stories from sports league representatives.
Commissioner Tagliabue testified that the NFL strongly endorsed
the restrictions proposed in S. 474.101 Tagliabue then informed the
Senate Subcommittee that as a seventeen-year-old at summer camp,
he recalled players being offered money, and he opined that the
money being offered to the youth at summer camp led down a road to
point shaving and corruption.102 Following Tagliabue’s testimony,
the Commissioner of Baseball, Francis Vincent, testified.103 Vincent
stated that the office of the Commissioner of Baseball was created as
a direct result of the 1919 World Series scandal.104 Vincent noted that
state-sponsored sports gambling runs the risk of undermining the
integrity of the sport.105 Legalized betting would be unlikely to slow
illegal gambling because illegal bookmakers allow gamblers to bet
on credit.106 The third in the trifecta of sports league chief executives
was NBA Commissioner David Stern, who stressed that statesanctioned sports gambling would create “point spread fans,” or fans
who do not care about winning but only whether a team covered the

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
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Id. at 17–18 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
Second PASPA Hearing, supra note 86, at 19 (statement of Sen. Charles Grassley).
Id.
Id. at 21 (statement of Paul Tagliabue, Comm’r, National Football League).
Id. at 22.
Id. at 37 (statement of Francis T. Vincent, Comm’r of Baseball).
Id.
Second PASPA Hearing, supra note 86, at 37.
Id. (statement of Francis T. Vincent, Comm’r of Baseball).
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point spread.107 The statement submitted by National Hockey League
(NHL) General Counsel Gil Stein echoed the sentiment of the three
commissioners. Stein noted that the NHL believed legalized
gambling would harm the integrity of the game, without providing
specifics.108
Chicago Bears linebacker Mike Singletary made a statement
following the testimony of the commissioners.109 Singletary argued
that state-sponsored gambling would create an added stressor on
America’s youth.110 Singletary also suggested that he might have
concerns about teammates playing to win if sports gambling were to
be legal across the United States—the implication being that some
professional athletes may seek to supplement their income by
wagering against their own teams.111 Valerie Lorenz of the National
Center for Pathological Gaming argued that the creation of new
forms of gambling would likely attract new gamblers.112 Lorenz’s
concern was shared by James A. Smith, the Director of Government
Relations for the Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist
Convention.113
The second hearing in the evolution of PASPA revealed many
themes similar to those in the previous hearing. The proposed
legislation was widely supported, with few speaking out in
opposition.114 The sports leagues advocated for the bill becoming
law, arguing that it was necessary to protect the integrity of the
products they sell and that there was an increased risk of corruption
of young members of society without it.115 The lone sports-leagueaffiliated dissenter was former Oakland Raiders defensive end Ben
Davidson who testified alongside a representative for the
107. Id. at 45 (statement of David J. Stern, Comm’r, National Basketball Association).
108. Id. at 59 (statement of Gil Stein, General Counsel, National Hockey League).
109. Id. at 66 (statement of Mike Singletary, Middle Linebacker, Chicago Bears).
110. Id.
111. Second PASPA Hearing, supra note 86, at 67.
112. Id. at 75 (statement of Valerie C. Lorenz, Ph.D., Director, National Center for Pathological
Gambling, Inc.).
113. Id. at 91 (statement of James A. Smith, Director of Government Relations, Christian Life
Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention).
114. See id.
115. Id. at 199 (statement of Ben Davidson, Former Defensive End, Oakland Raiders).
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Massachusetts State Lottery and stated that state-regulated gambling
is the lesser evil in comparison to illegal gambling.116 The New York
Times covered this second hearing and noted that the legislation was
unlikely to pass.117 Before the fourth quarter of 1991, Congress
would hold their ultimate hearing on the PASPA legislation.
C. 1991: Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act
The final congressional hearing on legislation that would become
PASPA occurred on September 12, 1991, before the House of
Representatives Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial
Law.118 Representative Jack Brooks of Texas opened the meeting and
expressed that he had observed a growth in the public’s fascination
with sports wagering.119 Brooks stated that the purpose of the hearing
was to consider whether sporting events were too sacred to the
American way of life to exclude them as a means of generating
revenue for the states.120
The House Subcommittee heard from a series of panels. The first
panel consisted of Commissioner Tagliabue, Boston Celtics President
Arnold “Red” Auerbach, Baltimore Orioles Assistant General
Manager Frank Robinson, and Richard Schultz of the NCAA.121
Tagliabue stated that he objected to the term “lottery” being used in
the proposed legislation; instead he wished for it to be replaced with
the term “gambling.”122 Tagliabue testified that when he was in
college at Georgetown University, he played in a fixed basketball
game at Madison Square Garden.123 He believed that gambling on
sports needed to be clearly marked as illegal.124 Tagliabue concluded
116. Id. at 196.
117. Steven A. Holmes, League Heads Speak out Against Sports Lotteries, N.Y. TIMES, June 27,
1991, at B15.
118. See Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act: Hearing on H.R. 74 Before the Subcomm.
on Econ. and Commercial Law of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Final
PASPA Hearing].
119. Id. (statement of Rep. Jack Brooks).
120. Id. at 2.
121. Id. at 9.
122. Id. at 10 (statement of Paul Tagliabue, Comm’r, National Football League).
123. Id.
124. Final PASPA Hearing, supra note 118, at 10 (statement of Paul Tagliabue, Comm’r, National
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that former United States Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach
believed that the proposed statute was directly related to the
anticorruption statutes of the 1960s.125 Auerbach testified that the
NBA was so concerned with the potential manipulation of games that
at one point in time players warming up for a game were banned
from speaking with anyone not in a team uniform.126 Auerbach stated
that fans would suspect a fix is in place anytime a player misses a
shot.127 The NBA’s position was that the proposed legislation would
preserve “our image throughout the world.”128
Frank Robinson testified that professional baseball players are
humans subject to the same faults as others, and state-sanctioned
sports betting may present too much temptation for some players to
resist.129 Robinson testified that he believed that legalized sports
betting would multiply the amount of money already being illegally
wagered, and for that reason it required intervention.130 Richard
Schultz of the NCAA argued that NCAA players are susceptible to
match fixers because players can be convinced to win and simply not
cover the point spread.131 Schultz noted that the grandfathering clause
in PASPA was supported by the NCAA because sports betting

Football League). It is worth noting that neither PASPA nor any other federal statute makes all forms of
sports gambling illegal. Some states even specify that de minimis bets are lawful. See, e.g., ALA.
CODE § 13A-12-21(b) (2017) (“It is a defense to a prosecution under this section that a person charged
with being a player was engaged in a social game in a private place. The burden of injecting the issue is
on the defendant, but this does not shift the burden of proof.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 528.010(1)
(West 2017) (“A person who gambles at a social game of chance on equal terms with other participants
does not otherwise advance gambling activity by performing acts, without remuneration or fee, directed
toward the arrangement or facilitation of the game as inviting persons to play, permitting the use of
premises therefor and supplying equipment used therein . . . .”).
125. Final PASPA Hearing, supra note 118, at 11 (statement of Paul Tagliabue, Comm’r, National
Football League).
126. Id. at 32 (statement of Arnold “Red” Auerbach, President, Boston Celtics).
127. Id. at 32–33.
128. Id. at 33. Auerbach’s comments neglect the fact that UK-based sportsbooks have offered wagers
on U.S.-based sports since at least the 1940s. History and the Start of Ladbrokes, GAMBLING SITES,
https://www.gamblingsites.org/history/ladbrokes [https://perma.cc/VZG5-R94K] (last visited Oct. 11,
2018).
129. Final PASPA Hearing, supra note 118, at 38 (statement of Frank Robinson, Assistant General
Manager, Baltimore Orioles).
130. Id. at 39.
131. Id. at 43 (statement of Richard Schultz, Executive Director, National Collegiate Athletic
Association).
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revenue was already included in the budgets for some states.132
Schultz concluded by noting that illegal gambling and legal gambling
pose identical problems from the NCAA’s perspective.133
Richard May of the National Conference of State Legislatures
appeared before the Subcommittee and noted that although his
organization does not take a position on sports gambling, the
proposed bill preempts states’ rights in “conducting their own fiscal
affairs.”134 Thomas O’Heir testified that the positions taken by the
sports leagues were hypocritical because they had accepted
advertising money from lotteries for years and were untroubled by
sports wagering in Nevada for more than fifty years.135 C. William
Byrne, athletic director at the University of Oregon, also expressed
opposition to the proposed House bill, noting that he was aware of
football pools that take place among staffers on Capitol Hill.136 He
further observed that those games are more expensive than the games
offered by the Oregon lottery.137 Byrne further noted that the money
generated by the Oregon lottery has gone back into funding the
university.138 Byrne’s testimony represented one of the few
dissenting voices among those who perceivably had interests
associated with the sports leagues.139
The final hearing regarding PASPA contained similar themes to
the previous two hearings. The sports leagues’ opposition focused on
hypothesized threats to integrity, and opposition to the bill centered
on the impingement of states’ rights and possibilities of lost
revenue.140 Additionally, those who opposed the bill focused on the
apparent hypocrisy of the sports leagues not having previously

132. Id. at 44.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 59 (statement of Richard May, Executive Director, National Conference of State
Legislatures).
135. Final PASPA Hearing, supra note 118, at 68 (statement of Thomas O’Heir).
136. Id. at 73 (statement of C. William Byrne, Athletic Director, University of Oregon).
137. Id.
138. Id. at 74.
139. Id. at 73.
140. Id. at 158–59 (statement of James J. Davey, Director, Oregon State Lottery, Member, North
American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries).
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challenged Nevada over the use of league marks.141 In the aftermath
of the third hearing on PASPA, the Justice Department weighed in on
the proposed statute.
In a letter to Judiciary Chairman Joseph Biden, Assistant Attorney
General W. Lee Rawls expressed several concerns with the proposed
legislation.142 Notably, Rawls flagged that the proposed legislation
would shift primary responsibility for determination of the legality of
gambling activities from the states to the federal government.143 The
Justice Department also expressed concerns that the proposed
legislation contained a number of exemptions that seemingly
cannibalized the intentions of lawmakers.144 However, the most stark
realization of the Justice Department’s letter was the assertion that
“[i]t is particularly troubling that S. 474 would permit enforcement of
its provisions by sports leagues.”145 Despite the Justice Department’s
opposition to the bill, a Senate Report in November 1991 endorsed
the proposed bill.146
The Senate Report noted that, despite opposition to the proposed
legislation, the Senate Judiciary Committee favorably recommended
the bill.147 The Senate Report, authored by Senator Biden, stated that
federal intervention was necessary because:
Sports gambling is a national problem. The harms it inflicts
are felt beyond the borders of those [s]tates that sanction it.
The moral erosion it produces cannot be limited
141. Final PASPA Hearing, supra note 118, at 159 (statement of James J. Davey, Director, Oregon
State Lottery, Member, North American Association of State and Provincial Lotteries).
142. See Letter from W. Lee Rawls, Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice, to the Honorable Joseph
R. Biden, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary 1 (Sept. 24, 1991) [hereinafter Rawls Letter].
143. Id. (“Generally speaking, it is left to the states to decide whether to permit gambling activities
based upon sporting events, although [f]ederal law generally prohibits any use of an interstate facility in
connection with such sports-based gambling activities.”).
144. Id. at 2 (“Also unclear is the purpose of the exception for pari-mutuel racing in S. 474. Parimutuel racing is not an amateur sport. Therefore, the bill’s prohibition on sports-based lotteries would
only apply to pari-mutuel racing—absent the express exception—if pari-mutuel racing were a team
sport. Further, the pari-mutuel racing exception raises questions about the application of the proposed
legislation to other sports, such as jai alai.”).
145. Id.
146. S. REP. NO. 102-248, at 1 (1991).
147. Id. at 3.
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geographically. Once a [s]tate legalizes sports gambling, it
will be extremely difficult for other [s]tates to resist the
lure. The current pressures in such places as New Jersey
and Florida to institute casino-style sports gambling
illustrate the point. Without [f]ederal legislation, sports
gambling is likely to spread on a piecemeal basis and
ultimately develop an irreversible momentum.148
Senator Grassley was the lone dissenting voice in the Senate
Report, expressing his concerns that PASPA was a substantial
intrusion into states’ rights.149 Grassley’s remarks, which fell on deaf
ears, concluded by articulating that “[s]ports pool lotteries pose no
threat to the integrity of professional sports. Rather, they are a
potential new source of substantial nontax revenue for the many
important programs funded by [s]tate lotteries.”150 PASPA
successfully passed nearly unanimously in the Senate and by voice
vote in the House. President George H.W. Bush signed it into law on
October 28, 1992.151 The legislation, however, underwent
tremendous changes prior to passage.
D. Evolution of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection
Act
The hearings held about PASPA and its predecessors featured a
debate on four statutes. The first hearing’s subject was S. 1772.152 S.
1772 was referred to as the “Sports Service Mark Protection Act of
1989.”153 The bill was to modify the Lanham Act by including a
provision banning any state or other jurisdiction in the United States
from sponsoring, operating, advertising, or promoting any lottery or
gambling scheme that directly or indirectly “uses or exploits . . . a
148. Id. at 5.
149. Id. at 12.
150. Id. at 17.
151. Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act of 1992, 28 U.S.C. §§ 3701–04 (2012),
invalidated by Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
152. See Initial PASPA Hearing, supra note 46, at 6.
153. S. 1772, 101st Cong. § 2 (1990).

Published by Reading Room, 2019

23

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 3

352

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

service mark owned by a professional sports organization.”154 Any
state-run lottery or gambling scheme that was based on games of a
professional sports organization would be deemed to be exploiting
said mark.155 The original version of legislation that would become
PASPA contained no exemptions.156
The second hearing regarding legislation that would become
PASPA heard testimony on two separate bills—S. 473 and S. 474. S.
473 was a modified version of S. 1172, containing expanded
definitions noting that a state may not use geographical references in
place of team names as a means of defeating the intent of the statute.
The bill also added applicability to amateur sports organizations.157
S. 473 also exempted from application gambling or wagering
activities that were conducted prior to August 31, 1990, and
parimutuel racing.158 S. 474 was a new bill that prohibited any state
from sponsoring, operating, advertising, authorizing, licensing, or
promoting any lottery or gambling activity based on a professional or
amateur sports organization.159 The statute also acknowledged that
sports gambling threatens the integrity of sports and granted a right
of enforcement jointly to the Attorney General of the United States or
a professional or amateur sports league “whose games or
performances are the subject of a prohibited lottery, sweepstakes, or
other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme.”160 S. 474 also
exempted schemes in existence between September 1, 1989, and
August 31, 1991, and parimutuel racing.161 The House debated an
identical bill to S. 474 in the form of H.R. 74.162
PASPA was a non-criminal statute limiting sports betting to
several states that had already offered sports gambling prior to the
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. S. 473, 102d Cong. § 2 (1991).
158. Id.
159. S. 474, 102d Cong. § 4 (1991).
160. H.R. 74, 102d Cong. § 5 (1991).
161. S. 474 § 6.
162. Compare S. 474 § 1 (“This Act may be referred to as the ‘Professional and Amateur Sports
Protection Act’”), with H.R. 74 § 1 (“This Act may be referred to as the ‘Professional and Amateur
Sports Protection Act’”).
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start of the congressional hearings on the statute.163 The final version
of PASPA contained an even more extensive exemption period and
included a one-year window for New Jersey to add sports gambling
in Atlantic City.164 In addition to the numerous exemptions contained
within the final version of PASPA, the statute also contained a
unique provision granting professional and amateur sports leagues
the authority to enforce the statute—equal to the enforcement
authority of the Attorney General.165
The passage of PASPA was a major milestone for both Congress
and the professional sports leagues as it marked the first wagersports-specific piece of gaming legislation to be passed since the
1961 Wire Act.166 Although the statute went more than a decade
without a significant challenge or even a single reported decision, the
Justice Department articulated the statute’s downfall from the very
beginning.167 In Section II, this article examines the judicial
challenges to PASPA and provides an analysis of the Supreme
Court’s ruling ending the federal government’s prohibition.
II. The Demise of PASPA
After PASPA’s passage in 1992, the statute was commonly
referred to as the Bradley Act, after Senator Bill Bradley’s
163. 28 U.S.C. § 3704 (2012), invalidated by Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
164. Id. §§ 3701–04 (2012). Representative Brooks explained that the exemption for New Jersey was
justified due to:
New Jersey’s unique role in the gaming industry. As most of you know, New
Jersey has had a highly regulated, legalized gaming industry in place in Atlantic
City since 1978. There is no other State in the country except Nevada which has
a comparable, state-regulated gaming industry. New Jersey and Nevada are in
direct competition when it come to the gaming industry. Nevada already had
legalized sports betting in place in its casinos. New Jersey has been considering
this issue, but has not put it on the ballot as yet. It just would not be fair for
Congress to give Nevada a virtual monopoly on sports betting, without first
giving New Jersey residents the opportunity to vote on this proposal and decide
it for themselves.
138 CONG. REC. 32,438 (1992) (statement of Rep. Brooks).
165. 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2012) (“A civil action to enjoin a violation of section 3702 may be
commenced in an appropriate district court of the United States by the Attorney General of the United
States, or by a professional sports organization or amateur sports organization whose competitive game
is alleged to be the basis of such violation.”).
166. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2012).
167. See Rawls Letter, supra note 142, at 3.
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impassioned efforts to see the passage of the statute.168 This version
of PASPA created a prohibition on government entities to “sponsor,
operate, advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact”
a sports gambling scheme that was not in place in between the time
frame of January 1, 1976, and August 31, 1990.169 This prohibition
effectively confined whole scale sports gambling to Nevada, granting
the state a de facto monopoly.170 The legislation granted an
exemption to at least three additional states—Oregon, Montana, and
Delaware—and enabled them to provide limited forms of sports
gambling.171 Despite testimony from the few skeptics, such as
Romano Mazzoli of Kentucky, who questioned whether the statute
would have any level of effectiveness, and given the observation that
sports gambling already existed, primarily in black markets, passage
was supported overwhelmingly by members of both parties in
Congress.172 The need for PASPA was also questionable and some
speculated it might be redundant, adding little to existing antigambling laws including the Wire Act, Illegal Gambling Business
Act (IGBA), and the Sports Bribery Act of 1964.173
The legislative history of PASPA reveals a great deal of confusion
over the scope and even the objectives of the legislation, as PASPA
does not ban sports gambling; rather, the law only attempts to contain
legal iterations of the practice to exempted states.174 The exemption
for New Jersey was pushed for by New Jersey Senator Frank
Lautenberg, who feared that a sports-betting monopoly granted to
Nevada would have devastating consequences for New Jersey’s

168. What Is PASPA, LEGAL SPORTS BETTING, https://www.legalsportsbetting.com/what-is-papsa/
[https://perma.cc/8VPK-XZ4F] (last visited Oct. 11, 2018).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012) (invalidated by Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018)).
170. Sean Gregory, The Risks and Rewards of the Supreme Court’s Sports Gambling Decision, TIME
(May 17, 2018), http://time.com/5280442/supreme-court-sports-betting-repeal [https://perma.cc/YH86D9ZJ].
171. Jason Goldstein, Note, Take the Money Line: PASPA, Bureaucratic Politics, and the Integrity of
the Game, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 362, 362 (2012).
172. Final PASPA Hearing, supra note 118, at 92 (statement of Rep. Romano Mazzoli).
173. Matthew D. Mills, The Failure of the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 16 U.
DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 215, 224–27 (2014).
174. See Second PASPA Hearing, supra note 86, at 2; Final PASPA Hearing, supra note 118, at 74.
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Atlantic City casino industry; Lautenberg’s plea would appear
prophetic two decades later.175
In addition to the substantive challenges to PASPA brought by
New Jersey and Delaware, the only other attempts to challenge the
authority of the federal government under the statute were dismissed
on procedural grounds before addressing the constitutionality of the
statute.176 In Flagler v. U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey,
the pro se plaintiff filed a complaint arguing that PASPA violates the
Tenth Amendment.177 The district court concluded that the plaintiff
lacked constitutional standing to challenge the statute and dismissed
the suit.178 Similarly, several years later, a court dismissed a lawsuit
brought by the Interactive Media Entertainment & Gaming
Association would also be dismissed on standing grounds.179 In the
more than twenty-five years that PASPA existed as federal law, there
were only three reported decisions that addressed the substance of the
statute itself, all originating from within the Third Circuit.180
175. Matthew T. Mierswa, Poor Man Wanna Be Rich, Rich Man Wanna Be King: The Battle to
Legalize Sports Betting in the Garden State, 38 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 447, 451 (2014).
176. Flagler v. U.S. Att’y Dist. of N.J., No. 06-3699, 2007 WL 2814657, at *3 (D.N.J. Sept. 25,
2007).
177. Id. at *1.
178. Id. at *3. Flagler argued that:
[because] “[g]aming/gambling is not mentioned in the U.S. Constitution one way
or another,” the decision on whether to allow gambling in general, and gambling
on sports specifically, should be reserved for the states. The complaint further
states that the PASPA does not fall under the powers of Congress derived from
the Commerce Clause of the Constitution because the activity it prohibits stays
within borders of a single state.
Id. at *2 (citations omitted). The district court, however, found that the plaintiff failed to satisfy two of
the three required prongs for standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute. Id. at *2–3. The
district court relied on Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife to find that the defendant lacked standing. Flagler,
2007 WL 2814657, at *3 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992)) (“First,
the plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact-an invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a)
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there
must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has to be fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some
third party not before the court. Third, it must be likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.”).
179. Interactive Media Entm’t & Gaming Ass’n, Inc. v. Holder, No. 09-1301, 2011 WL 802106, at
*10 (D.N.J. Mar. 7, 2011).
180. See NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 209 (3d Cir. 2013), abrogated by Murphy v.
NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018); Office of the Comm’r of Baseball v. Markell, 579 F.3d 293, 295 (3d
Cir. 2009); NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 554 (D.N.J. 2012).
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A. Office of Commissioner of Baseball v. Markell
PASPA’s statutory language has led to several challenges
regarding the constitutionality of the bill.181 In 2009, Governor Jack
Markell of Delaware signed into law the Sports Lottery Act. The bill
authorized the expansion of Delaware’s existing sports-betting
scheme, an exclusive NFL lottery scheme that required players to
select a minimum of three teams in a parlay format.182 Governor
Markell argued that the new lottery scheme would help alleviate the
state’s $700 million budget deficit by an estimated $50–$100 million
per year.183 Markell’s new law was quickly met with a challenge
from the major professional sports leagues and the NCAA, under a
provision granting dual enforcement authority to professional and
amateur sports leagues, concurrent with the Department of Justice.184
The challenge to PASPA advanced by Delaware did not directly
challenge the statute as a per se violation of an enumerated
constitutional provision but instead challenged the law under the
doctrine of vagueness.185 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in
favor of the sports-league plaintiffs, finding that PASPA was
unambiguous as to its exemption regarding existing schemes.186
B. Christie I
The second substantive challenge to PASPA arose in 2012 when
Governor Chris Christie of New Jersey signed into law the Sports
Gambling Law, which authorized casinos and racetracks to offer Las
Vegas-style sports betting at their facilities.187 The sports leagues
181. See NCAA, 730 F.3d at 209; Markell, 579 F.3d at 293.
182. Dylan Oliver Malagrino, Off the Board: NCAA v. Christie Challenges Congress to “Move the
Line” on the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 375, 391–92
(2013).
183. Id. at 391.
184. 28 U.S.C. § 3703 (2012) (providing the authority for civil enforcement of PASPA “by the
Attorney General of the United States, or by a professional sports organization or amateur sports
organization whose competitive game . . .”); Malagrino, supra note 182, at 391–92.
185. Markell, 579 F.3d at 301.
186. Id. at 302–03.
187. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief ¶¶ 22–26, NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d
551 (D.N.J. 2012) (No. 2:12-CV-04947), 2012 WL 3191255.
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quickly challenged the provisions of the law, arguing that New
Jersey’s law was a direct affront to PASPA.188 The challenge by New
Jersey asserted that PASPA ran afoul of a number of constitutional
provisions—the anti-commandeering provision of the Tenth
Amendment, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and their
principles, and the doctrine of equal sovereignty or “Equal Footing
Doctrine.”189 In the district court, New Jersey was unsuccessful in
mounting its multifaceted constitutional attack on the law, and the
court ruled that PASPA was indeed a constitutional exercise of
legislative authority.190 In New Jersey’s appeal to the Third Circuit,
the court reached a 2–1 decision in favor of the sports leagues,
finding that PASPA was constitutional.191 Judge Vanaskie,
concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that although
PASPA did not violate principles of equal sovereignty, the statute did
violate the anti-commandeering principles of the Tenth Amendment
and should thus be invalidated.192
In what appeared to be a final challenge to the constitutionality of
PASPA by New Jersey, the state filed a petition to the Supreme
Court; however, the Court denied the petition.193 The petition to the
Supreme Court raised an additional constitutional challenge
regarding the legality of the conferral of an indefinite intellectual
property right to the sports leagues, an issue expressly forbidden by
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the Constitution.194 Despite the
finality of the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, Governor Christie
signed into law a partial repeal of New Jersey’s sports gambling laws
in 2014, something that the United States stated would not be in
violation to PASPA in a brief filed with the Supreme Court.195
188. Id. ¶¶ 18–20.
189. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d at 554.
190. Id.
191. NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208, 240 (3d Cir. 2013), abrogated by Murphy v. NCAA,
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
192. Id. at 241, 251 (Vanaskie, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
193. NCAA, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (2014).
194. Brief for Amici Curiae Ryan M. Rodenberg, Anastasios Kaburakis & John T. Holden in Support
of Petitions for Writ of Certiorari at 2, 7, Christie, 134 S. Ct. 2866 (No. 13-967), 2014 WL 1246719 at
*2, *7.
195. Brief of the United States at 11, NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
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C. Daily Fantasy Sports
Although litigation was the eventual cause for the downfall of
PASPA and the inevitable increase in legalized sports betting across
the country, daily fantasy sports also played an important role in
signaling a change in societal attitudes to gambling products
associated with and based on a sport.196 The explosion of daily
fantasy sports came in the wake of a Justice Department crackdown
on online poker websites and sports-gambling sites.197 Though
initially conceived in the mid-2000s, daily fantasy sports took several
years and the entrance of two venture-capital-backed companies to
really push the market forward.198 The emergence of daily fantasy
sports led many to speculate that the companies entering this space
would be prosecuted for violating federal and state gambling laws.199
While many outside observers saw contests that looked like illegal
sports betting products, the industry pushed back, citing an
exemption for certain fantasy sports in the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act as evidence of widespread legality.200
Although this was a strained argument, because a rule of construction
in the statute proscribed the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act from modifying any other federal or state law,201
the public relations company successfully parlayed this issue into a

196. See John T. Holden & Simon A. Brandon-Lai, Advertised Incentives for Participation in Daily
Fantasy Sports Contests in 2015 and 2016: Legal Classifications and Consumer Implications, 15 ENT.
& SPORTS L.J. at 1, 1 (Oct. 4, 2017), https://www.entsportslawjournal.com/articles/10.16997/eslj.207/
[https://perma.cc/3XTN-9PUL] (surveying the impact of daily fantasy sports on lessening society’s
formerly hard stance against sports gambling).
197. Marc Edelman, Navigating the Legal Risks of Daily Fantasy Sports: A Detailed Primer in
Federal and State Gaming Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 117, 121–23 (2016) (noting the federal crackdown
on sportsbooks and online poker). The raids on online poker sites is referred to as “Black Friday” in the
industry and saw some of the largest Texas Hold ‘Em website domains seized by the Department of
Justice. Lawson v. Full Tilt Poker Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 2d 476, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). Similarly, the
crackdown on online sportsbooks is referred to as Blue Monday and resulted in a number of arrests and
prominent internet domains being seized by federal authorities. See Ryan M. Rodenberg & Anastasios
Kaburakis, Legal and Corruption Issues in Sports Gambling, 23 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 8, 9 (2013).
198. Edelman, supra note 197, at 124, 126, 145 (deeming Kevin Bonnet, who launched a website
called FantasySportsLive.com in 2007, “the creator of ‘daily fantasy sports”).
199. Id. at 126.
200. See Holden, supra note 55, at 104.
201. 31 U.S.C. § 5361(b) (2012).
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meaningful diversionary tactic as the companies continued to grow,
attracting hundreds of millions in investment money.202
Daily fantasy sports came to be known by the name “fantasy
sports.”203 This name established an association with traditional
season-long fantasy games, which were often played among small
groups of friends for nominal amounts of money.204 The daily
version shortened the temporal commitment, anonymized the
competition, and increased the frequency with which users could
participate.205 The anonymity and frequency of the contests drew
skepticism that the contests were indeed fundamentally distinct from
widely-prohibited sports gambling, but by the time these contests had
gained widespread notoriety, they had hundreds of thousands of
active users in the United States.206 The two principal companies had
gained mainstream attention by devoting tens of millions of dollars to
advertising budgets, which saw television advertisements airing
multiple times an hour on major networks during their peak.207 The
incessant television advertising, in conjunction with several highprofile scandals regarding daily fantasy company employees playing
on competitors’ websites, resulted in a series of state-level
investigations—most prominently in New York.208
As the industry continued to gain attention from state lawmakers
who examined whether their gambling laws were applicable to daily
fantasy sports, a number of states began to express an interest in
sports betting.209 As Christie II progressed, the momentum for
202. Daily Fantasy Sports Investment and Acquisition Tracker, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT,
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/dfs-investment-and-acquisition-tracker
[https://perma.cc/6VCB3L28] (last updated Feb. 23, 2018).
203. Daily Fantasy Sports, LEGAL SPORTS REP., https://www.legalsportsreport.com/daily-fantasysports/ [https://perma.cc/CDW4-WDST] (last updated Aug. 1, 2018).
204. Id.
205. Edelman, supra note 197, at 127 n.55.
206. Holden & Brandon-Lai, supra note 196, at 1, 5.
207. Id. at 5.
208. John T. Holden, Will F. Green & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Daily Fantasy, Tipping, and Wire Fraud,
21 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 8 (2017).
209. Legislative
Tracker:
Sports
Betting,
LEGAL
SPORTS
REP.,
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/sportsbetting-bill-tracker [https://perma.cc/A94B-6EL4] (last visited
Aug. 1, 2018). Beginning in 2016, four states in addition to New Jersey introduced various bills that
would legalize sports betting. Id. In 2017, fifteen states introduced legislation to legalize sports betting.
Id.
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legalized sports betting continued to build, with many seeing daily
fantasy sports as a placeholder for legal sports betting.210 By the time
Christie II reached the Supreme Court, two of the plaintiffs in the
case had begun to express a desire for legalized sports betting, with
NBA commissioner Adam Silver authoring an op-ed in the New York
Times.211
D. Christie II
In New Jersey’s second attempt to allow its residents to lawfully
bet on sports, the governor signed into law a piece of legislation that
effectively repealed most regulations associated with sports gambling
being conducted at the state’s horse racing tracks and casinos.212
Shortly thereafter, the quintet of sports leagues who brought suit in
Christie I reunified to once again sue then-Governor of New Jersey,
Chris Christie.213 The New Jersey legislators had taken the advice of
the United States Solicitor General’s office, which argued in Christie
I that New Jersey was free to repeal “in whole or in part” their sports
gambling prohibitions without running afoul of PASPA.214 Although
the government had stipulated that a repeal would not offend PASPA
in Christie I, the sports league plaintiffs argued that, indeed, a repeal
was tantamount to an authorization, one of PASPA’s forbidden
acts.215 However, the federal district court disagreed with the state’s
210. Dustin Gouker, If States Want to Pay for Their Budgets with Fantasy Sports, They Need to Get
Creative,
LEGAL
SPORTS
REPORT
(Aug.
31,
2017,
10:10
AM),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/15333/state-revenue-fantasy-sports [https://perma.cc/94SU-HE2N].
211. Adam Silver, Opinion, Legalize and Regulate Sports Gambling, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/14/opinion/nba-commissioner-adam-silver-legalize-sportsbetting.html [https://perma.cc/PDW9-PC7P] (“B[etting] on professional sports is currently illegal in
most of the United States outside of Nevada. I believe we need a different approach.”). Similarly, Major
League Baseball Commissioner Rob Manfred endorsed a change to federal laws as well. See Brandon
Schlager, Rob Manfred: MLB rethinking stance on sports betting, SPORTING NEWS (Feb. 8, 2017),
http://www.sportingnews.com/us/mlb/news/mlb-gambling-rules-rob-manfred-reconsider-pete-rose-hallof-fame/1dctoqm3i8mvi11ltn6toaigmj [https://perma.cc/CHP5-454A].
212. S.B. 2460, 216th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2014); Act of Jan. 17, 2012, ch. 231, §§ 1–6, 2011 N.J.
ch. 12A, 7–9 (repealed 2014).
213. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, NCAA v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488
(D.N.J. 2014).
214. Brief for the United States in Opposition at 11, Christie v. NCAA, 730 F.3d 208 (3d Cir. 2013).
215. Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, supra note 213, at 3, 18. PASPA forbids states
and individuals from “sponsor[ing], operat[ing], advertis[ing], promot[ing], licens[ing], or authoriz[ing]
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lawmakers, holding that PASPA was a valid preemption of even the
state’s efforts to repeal the existing gambling laws.216
Following a second 2-1 loss at the Third Circuit, the Christie II
defendants petitioned for a rehearing en banc, which the Circuit court
granted.217 Despite the extraordinary measure of granting a rehearing
en banc, the Third Circuit bench voted in favor of the plaintiffs by a
vote of 9–3.218 The majority opinion, authored by Circuit Judge
Rendell, held that New Jersey’s 2014 law violated PASPA and
determined that the partial repeals were tantamount to an
authorization because they effectively determined where sports
betting can take place, how it may take place, and who can place
wagers.219 In addition to finding that the 2014 repeal was the
equivalent to an authorization, the majority found that PASPA does
not commandeer the state legislature by requiring that the state
maintain its laws because the majority maintained that although a
partial repeal would not comply with the statute, a full repeal would
not offend PASPA.220
The twelve judges were split 9–3 with two separate dissents
filed.221 Judge Fuentes, in his dissent with Judge Restrepo, pointed
out the absurdity of the linguistic gymnastics of equating a repeal
with an authorization.222 Judge Fuentes highlighted the fact that the
sports gambling schemes pursuant to a law or compact.” 28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2012) invalidated by
Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
216. NCAA v. Christie, 61 F. Supp. 3d 488, 506 (D.N.J. 2014), overruled by Murphy v. NCAA, 138
S. Ct. 1461 (2018). Though largely beyond the scope of this paper, District Judge Shipp determined that
PASPA expressly preempted New Jersey’s actions. Id. at 503–06. PASPA, however, contains no
express preemption language, and instead Shipp examined the legislative history, determining that
PASPA’s intent was to “keep sports betting from spreading.” Id at 505–06. The Supreme Court has
articulated that Congress can expressly preempt state law by doing so within its “statute’s express
language or through its structure and purpose.” Altria Grp. v. Good, 555 U.S. 70, 76 (2008) (citing Jones
v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977)). This position is problematic, however, because the
desire to stop the spread of sports betting is not something PASPA does particularly well. In fact, it only
stops legal and state-regulated sports betting from spreading and does nothing to stop illegal gambling,
which is undoubtedly far more pervasive.
217. NCAA v. Governor of N.J., 832 F.3d 389, 389 (3d Cir. 2016), overruled by Murphy v. NCAA,
138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
218. Id.
219. Id. at 396–97.
220. Id. at 400–02.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 402–06 (Fuentes, J., dissenting).
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majority’s opinion would allow for the state to repeal all its gambling
laws (which does not offend PASPA) and then immediately begin
passing restrictions, such as requiring a minimum age to wager.223
Both dissents also highlighted the absurdity of states facing what is in
effect an ultimatum, where they are forced to choose between a
“Wild West” with no laws governing sports betting or maintaining
laws that they do not desire.224
The grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court marked the first time
the Court had the opportunity to interpret the statute.225 The Court
framed the issue to be whether PASPA unconstitutionally
commandeered the states in contravention of New York v. United
States and Printz v. United States by requiring New Jersey to
maintain its laws prohibiting sports gambling.226 In ruling that
223. NCAA, 832 F.3d at 402–06.
224. Id. at 405 (“Suppose the State did exactly what the majority suggests it could have done: repeal
completely its sports betting prohibitions. In that circumstance, sports betting could occur anywhere in
the State and there would be no restrictions as to age, location, or whether a bettor could wager on
games involving local teams. Would the State violate PASPA if it later enacted limited restrictions
regarding age requirement and places where wagering could occur? Surely no conceivable reading of
PASPA would preclude a state from restricting sports wagering in this scenario. Yet the 2014 Repeal
comes to the same result.”).
225. Greater New Orleans Broad. Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 179–80 (1999). PASPA
was, however, mentioned on two previous occasions by the Supreme Court. Id. (citations omitted) (“A
separate statute, the 1992 Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, proscribes most sports
betting and advertising thereof. Section 3702 makes it unlawful for a State or tribe ‘to sponsor, operate,
advertise, promote, license, or authorize by law or compact’—or for a person ‘to sponsor, operate,
advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact’ of a State or tribe—any lottery or gambling
scheme based directly or indirectly on competitive games in which amateur or professional athletes
participate. However, the Act also includes a variety of exemptions, some with obscured congressional
purposes: (i) gambling schemes conducted by States or other governmental entities at any time between
January 1, 1976, and August 31, 1990; (ii) gambling schemes authorized by statutes in effect on October
2, 1991; (iii) gambling ‘conducted exclusively in casinos’ located in certain municipalities if the
schemes were authorized within 1 year of the effective date of the Act and, for ‘commercial casino
gaming scheme[s],’ that had been in operation for the preceding 10 years pursuant to a state
constitutional provision and comprehensive state regulation applicable to that municipality; and (iv)
gambling on pari-mutuel animal racing or jai-alai games. These exemptions make the scope of § 3702’s
advertising prohibition somewhat unclear, but the prohibition is not limited to broadcast media and does
not depend on the location of a broadcast station or other disseminator of promotional materials.”); see
also Shelby City v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 588 (2013) (citations omitted) (“Today’s unprecedented
extension of the equal sovereignty principle outside its proper domain—the admission of new States—is
capable of much mischief. Federal statutes that treat States disparately are hardly novelties.”).
226. See Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461, 1475 (2018). In New York v. United States, the Court
held, “[T]he Constitution has never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the
States to govern according to Congress’[s] instructions.” New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162
(1992). In Printz v. United States, the Court held that the Federal government cannot require a state to
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PASPA violates the anti-commandeering principle, Justice Alito
stated that the anti-commandeering principle is fundamental to
creating accountability in the political system, and if there are
intrusions into state areas of authority, it can impermissibly muddy
the waters as to who is responsible for consequences of legislation.227
In a damning condemnation of PASPA, Justice Alito wrote:
The PASPA provision at issue here—prohibiting state
authorization of sports gambling—violates the anticommandeering rule. That provision unequivocally dictates
what a state legislature may and may not do. And this is
true under either our interpretation or that advocated by
respondents and the United States. In either event, state
legislatures are put under the direct control of Congress. It
is as if federal officers were installed in state legislative
chambers and were armed with the authority to stop
legislators from voting on any offending proposals. A more
direct affront to state sovereignty is not easy to imagine.228
In addition to finding that PASPA impermissibly commandeered
the New Jersey legislature, the majority found that the offending
provisions of PASPA were not severable, thereby dooming the entire
statute.229 The Court held that the provision of PASPA prohibiting
state action could not be severed from the provision prohibiting
private action, ruling that Congress intended the public and private
prohibitions to be deployed in tandem and, without one, the other
must similarly fail.230 In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas
added that the question to ask regarding severability is whether
Congress would have desired the statute to be passed absent the

enforce its own laws; rather the powers of the states and federal governments are separate and unequal,
with the federal government confined to enforce its own laws, without conscripting either state
legislatures or state officers. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).
227. Murphy, 138 S. Ct. at 1475.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 1484.
230. Id.
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severed portion, which in this case the answer was no; as such
PASPA was unsalvageable.231
The death of PASPA has ushered in a new era. For the first time in
the new millennium, states are able to authorize sports wagering for
their citizens. However, the rise of opportunity for the padding of
state coffers is not without challenges. Indeed, there remains a
number of challenges for states at both the federal and state levels, as
well as obstacles from private enterprise.232 Overcoming these
challenges will be easier for some areas than it will be for others.
Despite this, there is an initial level of enthusiasm surrounding the
opportunity for a new source of revenue.233
III. The Rise of Legal Sports Betting
Contrary to the perceptions that sports betting was widely desired
and PASPA was the sole obstacle in its way, there are numerous
remaining obstacles to widespread gambling legalization. In fact,
nearly every state has maintained laws prohibiting sports
wagering.234 The challenges regarding legalizing sports betting in
many states are complex and have both regulatory and political
obstacles. For example, the political climate in a variety of states
remains quite conservative on issues like gambling.235 This moral
opposition and its political consequences may be a more substantial
obstacle to legalization in a state like Utah than the task of repealing
231. Id. at 1485 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Thomas also stated his opinion that sports gambling
should not be considered interstate commerce by default in contrast to the dissent. Id. at 1. This position
was also advanced by the author in an Amicus Brief filed in the case. Brief for Researcher John T.
Holden as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 35, Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
232. John Holden, Sports Betting Legalization: Biggest Issues Preventing Widespread Wagering,
ACTION NETWORK (July 29, 2018, 5:00 PM), http://www.actionnetwork.com/news/sports-bettinglegalization-biggest-issues-challenges-hurdles [https://perma.cc/PP4P-95VT].
233. See Steve Mendelson, Sports Gambling and Tax Money: Coming Soon to a State Near You, INC.
(May 16, 2018), http://www.inc.com/steve-mendelsohn/sports-gambling-tax-money-coming-soon-to-astate-near-you.html [https://perma.cc/K5GT-F2FQ].
234. Chuck Humphrey, State Gambling Law Summary, GAMBLING LAW U.S. (Mar. 22, 2017),
http://www.gambling-law-us.com/State-Law-Summary [https://perma.cc/M5BN-YTX3] (providing an
overview of state gambling laws).
235. Phil Hensel, Sports Betting is Now Legal in Several States, NBC NEWS (Aug. 13, 2018, 5:13
AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/sports-betting-now-legal-several-states-many-othersare-watching-n894211 [https://perma.cc/P6YX-UPPQ].
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state laws governing sports betting.236 Likewise, at the federal level,
there are a number of federal laws that may continue to act as an
obstacle to the spread of sports wagering.
A. Federal Obstacles
Federal law is replete with a variety of statutes that continue to
pose some obstacles for the expansion of sports betting into some
states. Although larger states may be of sufficient size for companies
to invest in the technology necessary to confine sports betting
geographically within the state, other more sparsely populated states
may lag behind in attracting such companies, particularly in the
realm of mobile betting if there is a requirement that infrastructure be
physically located within a particular state.237 This is a primary
concern under the Wire Act.238
1. The Wire Act
The Wire Act was one of the crowning achievements of thenAttorney General Robert F. Kennedy’s Department of Justice in its
war against organized crime during the early 1960s.239 The statute
emerged out of the Kefauver Committee hearings nearly a decade
earlier,240 and after a series of deliberative hearings, which debated

236. Dennis Romboy, Utah GOP Lawmakers Hail Decision on Sports Betting as Win for States’
Rights, DESERET NEWS (May 14, 2018, 2:56 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/900018566/utahgop-lawmakers-hail-decision-on-sports-betting-as-win-for-states-rights.html
[https://perma.cc/J8SQZYEA]. Utah is widely regarded as one of the most restrictive states on gambling, as the state is one of
only two states that do not even allow for the sale of lottery tickets. Id. Though Utah did file an amicus
brief in support of New Jersey, lawmakers argued that the brief was focused on supporting the rights of
states to self-govern and was not an endorsement of sports gambling. Id.; see also Brief for West
Virginia et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Murphy v. NCAA, 138 S. Ct. 1461 (2018).
237. Paul J. Fishman, Marcus A. Asner & Ian Jay, Supreme Court Overturns Federal Prohibition on
State Authorization of Sports Wagering Under the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act,
ARNOLD
&
PORTER
(May
31,
2018),
https://www.arnoldporter.com/en/perspectives/publications/2018/05/supreme-court-overturns-federalprohibition [https://perma.cc/8CST-RS2H].
238. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (2012).
239. DAVID G. SCHWARTZ, CUTTING THE WIRE: GAMING PROHIBITION AND THE INTERNET, 80–81
(2005).
240. S. REP. 82-725, supra note 29.
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the intended scope of the statute, the bill was finally passed.241
Liability under the Wire Act requires several elements: (1) being in
the business of betting or wagering; (2) knowing use of a wire
communication facility; (3) transmitting bets or wagers, or
information to assist in placing bets or wages, in interstate or foreign
commerce; (4) the subject of the bets or wagers must be a sporting
event or contest.242 The statute further contains a safe harbor
provision that exempts the transmission of information (not bets
themselves) in placing bets or wagers on a sporting event or contest,
so long as the transmission is lawful in both the sending and
receiving jurisdictions.243
One of the most important inquires for a Wire Act claims centers
on who is in the business of betting or wagering.244 The exact
meaning of being in the “business of betting or wagering” is well
established in jurisprudence, and there is evidence that Congress
intended the statute to target “layoff men” or big team bookies who
use networks to limit their risk across the country.245 The Wire Act
was intended to serve as means of attacking criminal organizations
that otherwise were able to avoid prosecution (in an era before the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), and as a result,
it has been argued that the language “business of betting or
wagering” was intended to apply broadly to include many individuals
associated with organized crime while excepting the casual bettor.246
Although the Wire Act was drafted to target organized crime in an
era in which criminal organizations drove fear into politicians and
citizens alike, the statute remains a real obstacle to legalized
241. Ben J. Hayes & Matthew J. Conigliaro, “The Business of Betting or Wagering”: A Unifying
View of Federal Gaming Law, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 445, 453 (2009).
242. 18 U.S.C. § 1084(a) (2012).
243. Id. § 1084(b); Ryan Rodenberg, The Wire Act of 1961: That Time RFK Sent JFK a Letter About
Sports Betting, SPORTS HANDLE (Mar. 5, 2018, 9:30 AM), https://sportshandle.com/the-wire-act-of1961-rfk-jfk-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/X3ZB-TWMV].
244. See Hayes & Conigliaro, supra note 241, at 447; John T. Holden, Mailbag Mythbusting: The
Wire Act and Sports Betting, Explained, SPORTS HANDLE (May 30, 2018, 1:30 PM),
https://sportshandle.com/mailbag-mythbusting-the-wire-act-and-sports-betting-explained
[https://perma.cc/A9NX-USR4].
245. Hayes & Conigliaro, supra note 241, at 454.
246. Id.
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gambling because of unresolved questions about cross-border
transmissions and the scope of the safe harbor exemption.247 New
Jersey has recently tried to note that intermediate routing should not
determine the location of the information, seemingly anticipating
questions about the Wire Act’s implication in such an interest.248
However, as nearly six years of litigation with New Jersey and the
private sports leagues over the scope of federal law show, New
Jersey’s opinions on the scope of federal law do not necessarily
reflect the view of the federal government.249 Some have speculated
that the federal government may be unlikely to interfere in states’
efforts to generate revenue and respect gaming operators desire to
provide a cost-effective service by locating servers in a central
location and transmitting information, creating a spoke network.
However, risk managers for gaming companies may see the risk as
too great in the absence of further clarification.250
2. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
In addition to the Wire Act, federal law has several other gamingspecific statutes that may complicate the spread of legalized sports
247. Tony Batt, The Wire Act: Is Its Bark Worse Than Its Bite?, GAMBLINGCOMPLIANCE (June 29,
2018), https://gamblingcompliance.com/premium-content/insights_analysis/wire-act-its-bark-worse-itsbite [https://perma.cc/9D2Y-V6RX].
248. Ifrah Law, Why We Won’t See a Federal Sports Betting Bill Soon, IFRAH ON IGAMING (July 30,
2018),
http://www.ifrahlaw.com/ifrah-on-igaming/wont-see-federal-sports-betting-bill-soon
[https://perma.cc/6VDX-3YYR].
249. See N.J. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5:12A-11(l) (West 2018) (“All wagers on sports events authorized
under this provision shall be initiated, received and otherwise made within this State unless otherwise
determined by the division in accordance with applicable federal and state laws. Consistent with the
intent of the United States Congress as articulated in the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
of 2006 (31 U.S.C. § 5361 et seq.), the intermediate routing of electronic data relating to a lawful
intrastate wager authorized under this provision shall not determine the location or locations in which
such wager is initiated, received or otherwise made.”); see also Law, supra note 248.
250. See United States v. Yaquinta, 204 F. Supp. 276, 279 (N.D. W. Va. 1962) (“Defendants’ counsel
argue that [because], in the transmission of the messages from New York to Nevada, the transmission
lines traverse many States where off-track betting is illegal, and must pass through telephone exchanges
in those States, the framers of the Act did not intend to make the incident of the locations of the
telephone exchanges of legal significance. The argument loses sight of the fact that the objective of the
Act is not to assist in enforcing the laws of the States through which the electrical impulses traversing
the telephone wires pass, but the laws of the State where the communication is received. To mix a
metaphor, the telephone wire may seem a slender thread on which to hang the federal crime, but it is a
substantial part of the web in which these defendants seem to be caught.”).
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betting. One that impacts both federal and state actions is the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA).251 The IGRA was passed by
Congress as a means of implementing a level of federal regulation on
the growing Indian gaming industry, which had begun to gain a
significant foothold in many states by the time of its passage.252 The
IGRA established the National Indian Gaming Commission, which
was granted authority to oversee gaming conducted on Indian
lands.253 The Act further divides gaming activities into three
regulatory classes.254 The first class of gaming is to be regulated
exclusively by the tribes; the second class by the tribes and the
National Indian Gaming Commission; and the third class is to be
regulated by the states and tribes, and includes “all lotteries, card
games, and games of chance other than bingo—these games must be
conducted pursuant to a tribal-state gaming compact.255
The location of sports betting in the three-class system has been
the subject of debate, with some believing sports betting would fall
into Class II and others believing that sports betting is a Class III
activity.256 Although likely desirable for sports betting to fall into
Class II, this position is historically undermined by a variety of
different sources including the Code of Federal Regulations, which
states that Class III gaming includes: “Any sports betting and
parimutuel wagering including but not limited to wagering on horse
racing, dog racing or jai alai.”257 Florida Attorney General Bill
McCollum echoed this opinion in an Advisory Opinion, issued at the
request of then-Florida Speaker of the House Marco Rubio, where
251. 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–09, 2711–21 (2018); 25 U.S.C. § 2710 (1994) (invalidated by Seminole
Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)).
252. Gaming Activities on Indian Reservations and Lands: Hearing on S. 555 and S. 1303 Before the
S. Comm. on Indian Affairs, 100th Cong. 1 (1987) (statement of Sen. Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman,
Special Committee on Indian Affairs).
253. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act § 5, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467, 2369 (codified at 25
U.S.C. § 2704(a)).
254. M. MAUREEN MURPHY, CONG. RESEARCH Serv., CRS REP. NO. 93–793A, INDIAN GAMING
REGULATORY ACT: JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTERPRETATIONS (1993).
255. Id.
256. Dave Palermo, Tribal Position on Sports Betting Will Come into Focus at Phoenix Conference,
LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Sept. 14, 2017, 1:31 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/15573/tribalgaming-and-sports-betting-niga-2017 [https://perma.cc/3UC8-BVXD].
257. 25 C.F.R. § 502.4(c) (2018).
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the Florida attorney general quoted the language of the Code of
Federal Regulations articulating that sports betting is a Class III
activity.258
The probable classification of sports betting as a type of Class III
gaming activity potentially complicates matters for both states and
tribes, as gaming compacts are often the result of months and even
years of negotiations.259 Because of this, states that have tribal
compacts may face substantial challenges to renegotiating what share
of revenue each party to the compact will receive.260 The IGRA is
likely to remain one of the biggest obstacles to the spread of legalized
sports betting. Without sports betting, Indian gaming generated more
than $31 billion in 2016, nearly three times what the private casinos
in Nevada generated in the same period.261
3. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
The third federal statute that may inhibit the spread of legalized
sports gambling is the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act
(UIGEA), the statute whose exemption for fantasy sports was largely
responsible for the emergence of daily fantasy sports.262 Although the
statute is of questionable application to the daily fantasy industry,
largely as a matter of semantics, lobbying, and contest structures,
there is no question that UIGEA implicates sports betting.263 UIGEA
is a 2006 law that targets payment processors like Visa, MasterCard,
and PayPal.264 The statute also implements requirements on banks

258. Fla.
AGO
2007-36
(Sep.
6,
2007),
available
at
http://www.myfloridalegal.com/ago.nsf/Opinions/23FBEF8B371FFCD68525734F004F8F6F
[https://perma.cc/PFK9-7MZ9].
259. Id.
260. Kevin Draper, Tim Arango & Alan Blinder, Indian Tribes Dig in to Gain Their Share of Sports
Betting, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/21/sports/sports-betting-indiancasinos.html [https://perma.cc/E8C9-UZYE].
261. Id.
262. See Dustin Gouker, UIGEA Author: “No One Ever Conceived” That Law Would Allow Daily
Fantasy
Sports,
LEGAL
SPORTS
REPORT
(May
8,
2015,
8:15
AM),
https://www.legalsportsreport.com/1369/uigea-author-did-not-intend-daily-fantasy-sports-carveout
[https://perma.cc/ZV6J-K54E].
263. Holden & Brandon-Lai, supra note 196.
264. Id.
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regarding the facilitation of payments to gambling websites.265
Although the statute does not modify any existing state or federal
laws, it contains a cornucopia of exemptions and is targeted at illegal
websites.266 There are likely questions among payment processors
and banks leery of processing transactions due to federal regulatory
uncertainty, even though the statute specifically exempts intermediate
routing, unlike the Wire Act.267
The marijuana industry may also serve as a model for caution by
the banking industry.268 Banks have generally shied away from
accepting business relationships with organizations in the marijuana
industry because of concerns about exposure to federal banking
laws.269 Although UIGEA certainly has some provisions built in,
such as predetermination about intermediate routing, the traditionally
conservative banking industry may be cautious about facilitating
some relationships in the industry, particularly because some
companies seek to test the boundaries of regulators with innovative
products.270 Whether the federal obstacle is UIGEA, or some other
banking, finance, or securities statute, the path forward likely
contains a number of challenges for operators to overcome before
sports betting takes off in every state. Existing federal statutes are but
one part of a trident hindering the widespread expansion of legalized
sports betting. In the next subsection, this article examines state-level
obstacles to expanded sports gaming.

265. 31 U.S.C. § 5361 (2012).
266. Id.
267. Id. § 5362(10)(E).
268. See Aaron Klein, Banking Regulations Create Mess for Marijuana Industry, Banks, and Law
Enforcement, BROOKINGS INST. (Apr. 23, 2018), http://www.brookings.edu/research/bankingregulations-create-mess-for-marijuana-industry-banks-and-law-enforcement
[https://perma.cc/4Z2HKKPM].
269. Id.
270. Eric Ramsey, DraftKings Sportsbook App Now in Stock for N.J. Sports Betting, LEGAL SPORTS
REPORT (Aug. 1, 2018, 12:30 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/22417/draftkings-sportsbookrelease [https://perma.cc/XNT3-BPEQ]. For instance, DraftKings—the daily fantasy company that has
entered the realm of sports betting—launched a product that includes a “Cash Out Button,” which will
enable users to effectively create a futures (securities) product out of their sports betting interest. Id.
This type of product blurs the lines between gambling regulators and securities regulators and may
cause some payment processors, banks, and other financiers to be cautious about jumping into the
industry. Id.
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B. State Obstacles
State-level obstacles to expanded sports wagering are the largest
impediment to widespread brick and mortar casino-style wagering
like the type of sports wagering most commonly associated with
Nevada.271 Although brick-and-mortar wagering is a huge step
forward from a near total prohibition, its revenue potential is dwarfed
in comparison to the potential revenue associated with mobile
wagering.272 Early projections estimate that by 2025 there may be as
many thirty-seven states offering sports betting but perhaps only a
dozen offering mobile or online wagering by that time.273 One of the
most pressing issues for many states is whether offering sports
betting would require a constitutional amendment for casinos and
regulators to oversee the practice.274
1. State Constitutions
Many state constitutions restrict the expansion of gambling within
the state and require amendments for there to be offerings of new
types of wagering.275 Amending state constitutions is often an
arduous process for lawmakers and citizens alike. For example, the
procedure for amending the California constitution has several
methods which can be undertaken.276 First, two-thirds of each
chamber of the legislature must propose an amendment for
271. An Examination of Sports Betting in America & Forecast of Revenues by State, GLOBAL MKT.
ADVISORS (Nov. 2017), http://globalmarketadvisors.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/GMA_AnExamination-of-Sports-Betting-in-America-Forecast-of-Revenues-by-State_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/H4DS-Q8DN].
272. Id.
273. Brian Barrett, The Sports Betting Revolution Will Be a Slow Play Online, WIRED (May, 15,
2018, 1:59 PM), http://www.wired.com/story/the-sports-betting-revolution-will-be-muted-online
[https://perma.cc/GNP3-UTBC].
274. See, e.g., Max Brantley, Arkansas Casino Amendment Includes Sports Betting, CDC GAMING
REPORTS INC. (May 24, 2018, 10:19 PM), http://www.cdcgamingreports.com/arkansas-casinoamendment-includes-sports-betting [https://perma.cc/9DKN-EP9W].
275. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 9.1. For example, New York bans casino gambling at more than seven
facilities in the state. Id.; see also CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 19; DEL. CONST. art. II, § 17; IDAHO CONST.
art. III, § 20; KAN. CONST. art. XV, § 3; MONT. CONST. art. III, § 9; N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 25; UTAH
CONST. art. VI, § 27.
276. Amending
State
Constitutions,
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Amending_state_constitutions [https://perma.cc/NX4A-PTDR].

Published by Reading Room, 2019

43

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 35, Iss. 2 [2019], Art. 3

372

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:2

ratification by the registered voters in the state.277 Second, petitioners
in the state can collect signatures, totaling at least 8% of the votes
cast in the most recent gubernatorial election, to qualify to have the
proposed amendment placed on the ballot.278 The third means is
through a state constitutional convention, whereby two-thirds of the
legislature agrees to call a constitutional convention, which places the
proposed measure on the ballot in the next general election.279 The
procedure for amending state constitutions is intentionally arduous,
and for states that require amendments to offer sports betting, there
may be an added delay while legislators attempt to ensure sufficient
voter interest before legislators invest time, money, and political
capital into such an initiative.
Some states have begun to consult with their attorney generals
regarding the feasibility of offering sports betting.280 Colorado
legislators asked the state attorney general about two questions
regarding the possibility of bringing sports betting to the state.281
First, lawmakers wanted to know whether a constitutional restriction
on lotteries would restrict sports betting, to which the attorney
general responded that sports betting would not require a
constitutional amendment in the state.282 Second, lawmakers asked
what would be necessary to offer sports gambling under Colorado
law, to which Colorado Attorney General Cynthia Coffman
responded that it could be accomplished through an amendment to
the state’s criminal code.283 Relatedly, other state regulators have
also anticipated the rise of sports betting and have started studying
the issue and making recommendations.284 Although many states are
277. Cal. CONST. art. XVIII, § 1.
278. Id. art. XVIII, § 3; id. art. II, § 8(B).
279. Id. art. XVIII, § 2.
280. See, e.g., Anna Staver, Colorado Can Legalize Sports Betting Without Amending Constitution,
Attorney
General
Says,
DENV.
POST
(Aug.
2,
2018,
4:11
PM),
http://www.denverpost.com/2018/08/02/attorney-general-colorado-sports-betting-legislation
[https://perma.cc/H393-BFSY].
281. Legality of Commercial Sports Betting in Colorado, Op. Att’y Gen. No. 18-02 (2018),
https://coag.gov/sites/default/files/contentuploads/ago/agopinions/cynthia-h-coffman/2018/no-18-02.pdf
[https://perma.cc/55F7-RTE3].
282. Id.
283. Id.
284. MASS.
GAMING
COMM’N,
WHITE
PAPER
ON
SPORTS
BETTING
(2018),
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beginning to move to seek opinions and studies on the feasibility of
issues regarding the legalization of sports betting, the hurdle that
continues to surface in many states is the impact of existing
relationships with tribal gaming partners within the states.
2. Tribal Gaming Compacts
With its passage in 1988, the IGRA became a landmark piece of
legislation.285 In the decades following its passage, Indian gaming in
the United States has seen gaming revenues increased from $100
million in 1988 to more than $28 billion in 2013.286 The tribal-state
gaming compacts, in sheer economic terms, are remarkable
successes; however, compromises in the negotiations have meant
underserved demand.287 There have also been significant
disagreements over the scope of permitted games in some states.288
Unfortunately for state legislators looking to jump at the opportunity
to quickly supplement state budgets, there is another challenge. To
avoid frequent tinkering or ongoing struggles over issues within the
compacts, some states, such as Oklahoma, have structured the
agreements such that every amendment means reopening
negotiations.289
The National Indian Gaming Association itself has been quite
cautious about wading into the sports betting waters.290 The National
Indian Gaming Association has voiced support for expanded sports
betting provided sports betting, satisfies nine enumerated conditions:

https://massgaming.com/wp-content/uploads/Commissioners-Packet-3-1-18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G7N5-F5F9].
285. Randall K. Q. Akee, Katherine A. Spilde & Jonathan B. Taylor, The Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act and Its Effects on American Indian Development, 29 J. ECON. PERSP. 185, 185 (2015).
286. Id. at 186.
287. Id. at 195.
288. Id.
289. Jacob McCleland & Molly Fleming, Oklahoma Tribes Look to the Future of Gaming Compacts,
KGOU (July 27, 2017), http://www.kgou.org/post/oklahoma-tribes-look-future-gaming-compacts
[https://perma.cc/H4VU-57LQ].
290. See Adam Candee, National Tribal Group Passes Resolution to Support Sports Betting Repeal,
with Caveats, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Apr. 24, 2018), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/19967/tribesresolution-sports-betting-repeal [https://perma.cc/W26Y-5ERZ].
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1. Tribes must be acknowledged as governments with
authority to regulate gaming;
2. Tribal Government Sports Betting revenues will not be
subject to taxation;
3. Customers may access Tribal Government Sports Betting
sites as long as Sports Betting is legal where the customer
is located;
4. Tribal rights under the IGRA and existing Tribal-State
gaming compacts must be protected;
5. IGRA should not be opened up for amendments;
6. Tribal Governments must receive a positive economic
benefit in any federal Sports Betting legalization proposals;
7. Indian Tribes possess the inherent right to opt into a
federal regulatory scheme to ensure broad-based access to
markets;
8. Tribal Governments acknowledge the integrity and
protection of the game and patron protections for
responsible gaming are of the utmost importance; and
9. Any consideration of the use of mobile, online or internet
gaming must adhere to these principles.291
The provisions laid out in the National Indian Gaming Association
resolution are likely to be quite contentious in some jurisdictions,
especially in some states where legislators seek to maximize the take
for their interests.292 One additional challenge for tribal interests is
that although many states seek to maintain good relationships with
tribal governments, most states are immune from suit in the event of
bad faith negotiations by virtue of the Eleventh Amendment.293
291. NAT’L INDIAN GAMING ASS’N, RES. NO. 01-LAS-BOD-4-16-18 (Apr. 16, 2018),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/SB-Resolution-Clean-Final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/M98V-N6CA].
292. Buck Wargo, Tribes Fear They Will Be Left out of Sports Betting Growth, Pass Internal
Resolution on PASPA and Tribal Integrity, CDC GAMING REP. INC. (Apr. 23, 2018),
http://www.cdcgamingreports.com/wargo-tribes-fear-they-will-be-left-out-of-sports-betting-growth
[https://perma.cc/SC9W-RHAF].
293. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75–76 (1996) (“[W]e have found that Congress
does not have authority under the Constitution to make the State suable in federal court under §
2710(d)(7). Nevertheless, the fact that Congress chose to impose upon the State a liability that is
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3. Tax Rates
In addition to challenges in passing legislation via obstacles with
state constitutions and previously existing tribal gaming compacts,
another problem states will have to grapple with is implementing
reasonable tax rates. In its legislation, Pennsylvania set the sports
betting tax rate at 36% of revenue, a figure arrived at by doubling the
applicable tax rate for revenue coming from casino table games.294 In
comparison to Nevada, which has been offering sports betting for
decades and taxes the activities at 6.75%, the Pennsylvania rate is
astronomical.295 Pennsylvania also charges a one-time $10 million
fee for a sports gambling license, limiting the size of a company that
may be able to enter the market; and with sportsbook profits often
operating on tight margins, high tax rates may mean a small number
of companies will want to compete in the market.296 Although
markets like Pennsylvania’s may still be able to attract sportsbooks,
even with astronomical tax rates, smaller states with more limited
populations may not have such luck. The final potential obstacle to
widespread legalized wagering explored in this article is the potential
for lawsuits initiated by private party sports leagues.

significantly more limited than would be the liability imposed upon the state officer under Ex parte
Young strongly indicates that Congress had no wish to create the latter under § 2710(d)(3). Nor are we
free to rewrite the statutory scheme to approximate what we think Congress might have wanted had it
known that § 2710(d)(7) was beyond its authority. If that effort is to be made, it should be made by
Congress, and not by the federal courts. We hold that Ex parte Young is inapplicable to petitioner’s suit
against the Governor of Florida, and therefore that suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment and must
be dismissed for a lack of jurisdiction.”). A small number of states, including California, have waived
their immunity, which may result in a more receptive environment. Dave Palermo, Implementation of
Sports Betting Would be ‘Tricky’ in Indian Country, If Federal Ban Lifted, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT
(Aug. 14, 2017), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/15006/sports-betting-tricky-in-indian-country
[https://perma.cc/U629-XEFB].
294. Adam Candee, Interesting Math: PA Sports Betting Tax Rate Came from Doubling Table Games
Rate, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (July 17, 2018), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/22089/pennsylvaniasports-betting-tax-rate [https://perma.cc/PMV3-VFEG].
295. Eric Ramsey, Let’s Talk About PA’s Insanely High Sports Betting Tax, PLAY PENN. (May 25,
2018), http://www.playpennsylvania.com/pa-sports-betting-tax-high [https://perma.cc/B948-VBRU].
296. Id.
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C. Private Sports League Challenges
Perhaps an inevitability will be a legal challenge from one or
several of the same five plaintiffs who have initiated the three
substantive PASPA lawsuits: the four major professional sports
leagues and the NCAA. The sports leagues have been quite vocal in
requesting what have been termed “integrity fees” from states that
offer legalized sports betting.297 Integrity fees have been referred to
as a tax on sports betting revenues.298 First appearing in draft
legislation in Indiana, a variety of bills across the country have
included these fees.299 The idea originates from regulations in France,
where professional leagues receive a percentage of money from the
gambling operators’ revenues from league games.300 Sports league
executives, in particular NBA Commissioner Adam Silver and Major
League Baseball Commissioner Rob Manfred, have led the push for
leagues to receive a royalty; however, their reliance on the model
implemented in France, and to a related extent in Australia, neglects
to account for U.S. law, in particular, the First Amendment.301
The two most vocal commissioners have framed their desire
around an integrity fee as being associated with the “league’s
intellectual property.”302 The commissioners’ framing of the issue is,
however, not entirely accurate, as much of the information necessary
297. Sports
Betting
Integrity
Fee,
LEGAL
SPORTS
REPORT,
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/integrity-fee [https://perma.cc/N4PD-G66T] (last visited Aug. 3,
2018).
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. John Holden, Can Leagues Own Data Rights When It Comes to US Sports Betting?, LEGAL
SPORTS REPORT (May 29, 2018), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/20745/leagues-and-fees-in-sportsbetting [https://perma.cc/W9R9-YRXD].
302. Joe Lemire, MLB’s Manfred Discusses Betting for First Time Since SCOTUS Decision, SPORT
TECHIE (May 22, 2018), http://www.sporttechie.com/sports-betting-supreme-court-mlb-rob-manfred
[https://perma.cc/Q8GP-7S34] (quoting Rob Manfred, Commissioner, Major League Baseball) (“We
spend the money to produce the product. Gambling, sports betting operations are free-riding on that
product. It’s our intellectual property at the end of the day.”); Jeff Zillgitt, NBA, MGM Resorts
International Announce New Multi-Year Partnership, USA TODAY (July 31, 2018),
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/nba/2018/07/31/nba-mgm-resorts-announce-new-multi-yearpartnership/872528002 [https://perma.cc/P4DV-T585] (quoting Adam Silver, Commissioner, National
Basketball League) (“And to the extent that product is then used for casinos, betting parlors to make
money on, we feel, just in the same way a musician that receives a royalty for the music that’s being
played, that we should receive some sort of royalty.”).
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to operate a sports gambling operation exists in the public domain,
and the leagues have previously litigated and lost the right to be
compensated for the information that they now seek compensation.303
Although all of the major sports leagues would likely desire to
overturn the existing precedent that seems to exclude their ability to
obtain intellectual property rights in the games and scores, this has
long been flagged as not within the scope of existing copyright law
and a potentially problematic exception to fundamental
understandings of intellectual property rights.304 Despite what is a
pretty formidable challenge in overcoming precedent, dating back to
the turn of the twentieth century, both Commissioners Silver and
Manfred, as well as NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman, have all
attempted to lobby state lawmakers to pass legislation imposing
integrity fees.305
Although the push for integrity fees has not been successful in
states that have passed bills legalizing sports wagering, there exists
another route for the sports leagues. As the sports leagues have not
had success lobbying on a state-by-state basis, they may seek to
initiate a lawsuit or lawsuits against gaming operators over perceived
intellectual property infringements.306 The NBA has already sought
to subvert the lack of a legislative royalty fee, by announcing a
partnership with MGM International, which will see the casino giant
303. C.B.C. Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818,
824 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the First Amendment trumps state law rights of publicity regarding the
use of names and player statistics in fantasy baseball); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d
841, 854 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that the distribution of sports scores recorded by Motorola did not free
ride on the NBA’s intellectual property rights); Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players’
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 976 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding that freedom of expression trumps the right of
publicity for a company who made baseball cards using parodies of real major league players).
304. See Initial PASPA Hearing, supra note 46. For instance, Garo Partoyan of the United States
Trademark Association argued, when Congress debated PASPA’s predecessor, that an amendment to
the Lanham Act allowing the sports leagues special interests would be fundamentally unfair. Id.
305. Kirstie Chiappelli, NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman Talks Gambling Negotiations,
SPORTINGNEWS (Aug. 1, 2018), http://www.sportingnews.com/us/nhl/news/nhl-gary-bettmangambling-sports-betting-legal-partner-nba-mgm-news/wwi2hp9vfp6s11emqqf8149qz
[https://perma.cc/7MXJ-YYSB]. NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman was quoted as stating, “From our
standpoint, we believe that, whether it’s our intellectual property, our data, whether its video of our
game, we have important assets and if somebody is going to avail themselves or want to avail
themselves of those assets in order to conduct their business, then we’re going to need to have a
negotiation.” Id.
306. Holden, supra note 232.
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as the NBA’s official gaming partner.307 Though this partnership
enables MGM casinos to utilize NBA logos and the NBA’s real-time
data feed, questions remain as to what value the partnership will add
for MGM beyond being able to use team logos.308 Although the deal
seems questionable, given the lack of proprietary content within the
NBA’s official data, at some point the NBA and other leagues may
seek to initiate lawsuits against companies not using official data
feeds despite what appears to be a likely negative outcome given
existing case law.309
The death of PASPA is but the removal of a single obstacle in the
challenge of widespread sports wagering. Though a formidable
hurdle has been cleared, there remain additional complications at the
federal, state, and organizational levels. Much remains uncertain
regarding the future of sports betting in the United States, and
valuable lessons have and will continue to be learned. In the
following section, this article examines some of the areas that have
been pushed to the background in the wake of the excitement over
the fall of PASPA.310
IV. Averting Disaster
The excitement over the freedom to legalize sports wagering has
gripped state lawmakers across the country like a vice, but the
legalization of sports wagering brings with it tremendous risks to
sports, bookmakers, and the public.311 One of the biggest costs
associated with the risks is the necessity for lawmakers to take steps
307. Kevin Draper, N.B.A. Makes MGM Resorts International Its First Gambling Partner, N.Y.
TIMES
(July
31,
2018),
http://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/31/sports/nba-betting-mgm.html
[https://perma.cc/NE4R-VS6B].
308. Brett Smiley, NBA Announces Historic Sports Betting Deal with MGM Resorts International,
SPORTS HANDLE (July 31, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/nba-announces-historic-sports-betting-dealwith-mgm-resorts-international [https://perma.cc/AGU4-GSUR].
309. See, e.g., Nat’l Basketball Ass’n v. Motorola, 103 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997); see also C.B.C.
Distribution & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007).
310. See Michael McCann, Winners and Losers from the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Sports
Gambling, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 14, 2018), http://www.si.com/more-sports/2018/05/14/winnerslosers-supreme-court-ruling-sports-betting-chris-christie-las-vegas [https://perma.cc/B8JQ-X2E2]. One
of the most pressing areas of concern is in ensuring adequate resources for those exhibiting problem
gambling tendencies. Id.
311. Gregory, supra note 170.
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to manage their states’ exposure. Among the early failures are
Pennsylvania’s 36% tax rate, which threatens the viability of sports
betting in the state.312 Noncompetitive tax rates are a very real threat
keeping legal bookmakers out of the marketplace or making it so
expensive that they cannot offer competitive betting lines in
comparison to bookmakers in the illegal market.313 If states do not
offer competitive pricing to illegal bookmakers, legalized sports
wagering will fail to recapture bettors from the illegal market, and
PASPA’s death will appear as little more than a few pages in a
textbook in the annals of history. The sports leagues’ entitlement to
an integrity fee is not based on strong legal ground; however,
protecting the integrity of both sports and sportsbooks must be a top
priority of lawmakers.
A. Integrity Issues
There are two layers of integrity issues. The first is ensuring the
integrity of the sportsbooks themselves, and the second is ensuring
that the integrity of the underlying sports events is protected with a
robust system of checks and balances. Ensuring the integrity of
sportsbooks is necessary to ensure that consumers are engaging in a
fair transaction and that the imprimatur of state endorsement through
regulation is not undermined. The integrity of sports betting operators
requires several components; like financial operators, it is necessary
to ensure that employees are not misusing proprietary or consumer
information for personal gain.314 The alleged misuse of insider
information also arose in the daily fantasy sports industry.315 For
312. Andrew Maykuth, PA’s Sports Betting Taxes So High Legal Bookmakers May Shun State,
PHILA. INQUIRER (July 16, 2018), http://www.philly.com/philly/business/pa-legal-sports-bookmakerstaxes-new-jersey-casinos-20180716.html [https://perma.cc/V4US-C6QR].
313. Adam Candee, Is It ‘Revenue Sharing’ or High Taxes for Sports Betting? Ask Rhode Island,
Delaware How They Slice the Pie, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (July 3, 2018),
http://www.legalsportsreport.com/21663/sports-betting-revenue-sharing [https://perma.cc/5U6B-4KBC]
(quoting Sara Slane, Senior Vice President of Public Affairs, American Gaming Association) (“States
should focus on the consumer experience and empower licensed, regulated operators the ability to offer
a competitive product that fosters betting in a safe way and shuts down the illegal market.”).
314. See Harold Demsetz, Corporate Control, Insider Trading, and Rates of Return, 76 AM. ECON.
REV. 313, 313 (1986) (an overview of potential uses of insider information in financial trading).
315. Holden, Green & Rodenberg, supra note 208, at 3.
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example, an employee at DraftKings who had access to information
that provided him with a competitive advantage, and he won more
than $350,000 in a contest on rival FanDuel, DraftKings’s rival.316
Another story of alleged misconduct by the major players in the daily
fantasy industry describes a DraftKings’s executive pulling up a
consumer’s line-up on his phone and mocking his player selections at
a party.317 To prevent these types of abuses, states looking to license
and regulate sports betting will need to implement consumer
protections. Massachusetts gaming regulators have suggested that
advertising consumer protections may actually encourage bettors to
migrate from the black market to the legal market.318
Protecting the integrity of legal sports betting markets through
transparent regulations that ensure solvency and protection against
abuses is one way that state-licensed sportsbooks can entice
consumers to use their products.319 Although states and casinos
continue to push back against paying an integrity fee to the sports
leagues, both leagues and sportsbooks have an interest in protecting
the integrity of the underlying sporting events from corruptors.320
Protecting the integrity of sports has been a primary concern for
American sports leagues since at least 1919, when the Chicago White
316. Id. at 4.
317. Id. at 5. It should be noted that both FanDuel and DraftKings have entered the sports betting
marketplace despite multiple reports of misconduct in the daily fantasy industry, including reports of
federal investigations into at least one company’s conduct. Id.; see Staff, Here’s Where the Federal
Investigations into Daily Fantasy Sports Might Be Focused, LEGAL SPORTS REPORT (Mar. 18, 2016,
4:47 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/9053/dfs-federal-issues [https://perma.cc/HW88-JDH3].
Relatedly, DraftKings CEO Jason Robins acknowledged non-compliance with the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act in a conference call with the Fantasy Sports Trade Association. David
Purdum, DraftKings CEO Acknowledged Some UIGEA Noncompliance in May Conference Call, ABC
NEWS (Nov. 19, 2015, 4:55 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Sports/draftkings-ceo-acknowledged-uigeanoncompliance-conference-call/story?id=35313282 [https://perma.cc/4279-C4VD].
318. MASS. GAMING COMM’N, supra note 284, at 18.
319. See David Purdum, Dodgers-Phillies Marathon Causes New Jersey Sportsbook Issue, ESPN
(July 25, 2018), http://www.espn.com/chalk/story/_/id/24191856/mlb-story-bettors-not-being-able-cashwinning-tickets-fanduel-meadowlands-sportsbook-tuesday-night [https://perma.cc/SHC4-BYFZ]. On
one of the first nights following the legalization of sports betting in New Jersey, there was an incident
involving miscommunication regarding a FanDuel-branded sportsbook and their policy for paying
bettors after a certain time. Id. This resulted in some bettors speculating that the sportsbook did not have
sufficient money to pay out bettors. Id.
320. John Holden, The Sports Bribery Act: A Look Back at Attempts to Aid Integrity, LEGAL SPORTS
REPORT (May 30, 2018, 12:41 PM), http://www.legalsportsreport.com/20813/sports-integrity-in-the-ushistory [https://perma.cc/Z6V2-VRGF].
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Sox allegedly fixed the World Series at the urging of reputed
organized crime figure Arnold Rothstein.321 The methods of
detection have improved greatly, but many of the sources of sports
corruption are the same today as they were in 1919.322
The increased sophistication in sports integrity is being publicly
driven by several for-profit companies that monitor online gambling
line movements looking for anomalous, suspicious, or unexplained
changes in pricing, which might indicate some form of corruption
taking place.323 Though these companies operate for profit, the
models they use to detect corruption are not overly sophisticated.
Similar studies have been run in academia with little cost, essentially
raising questions about the proprietary nature of the integrity
models.324 Relatedly, there are also substantial questions about the
proprietary nature of the data these companies collect and analyze,
and internal reports indicate that much of the information appears to
be scraped from various sports betting websites.325 There are
meaningful questions surrounding the efficacy of entrusting for-profit
entities with protecting the integrity of sport when the companies
may have conflicting incentives to report or not report information
depending on who is employing the companies.326 Although private
parties may appear equipped to protect sports organizations, they lack
the law enforcement capabilities of local, state, and federal
321. John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, The Sports Bribery Act: A Law and Economics
Approach, 42 N. KY. L. REV. 453, 455 (2015).
322. See id. at 462–63; John T. Holden & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Lone-Wolf Match-Fixing: Global
Policy Considerations, 9 INT’L J. SPORT POL’Y & POL. 137, 137 (2016).
323. David
Cook,
Fixers
Beware,
GAMBLING
INSIDER
(Jan.
12,
2016),
https://www.gamblinginsider.com/in-depth/1667/fixers-beware [https://perma.cc/UE7X-LFXY]; About
Us, SPORT RADAR, https://sportradar.us/about-us [https://perma.cc/4SJY-FWUY] (last visited Aug. 4,
2018).
324. Elihu D. Feustel & Ryan M. Rodenberg, Sports (Betting) Integrity: Detecting Match-Fixing in
Soccer, 19 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 689, 689 (2015); Ryan M. Rodenberg & Elihu D. Feustel,
Forensic Sports Analytics: Detecting and Predicting Match-Fixing in Tennis, 8 J. PREDICTION MKTS.
77, 81, 88 (2014).
325. DAVID FORREST & IAN G. MCHALE, AN EVALUATION OF SPORTRADAR’S FRAUD DETECTION
SYSTEM
1–3
(2015),
https://fds.integrity.sportradar.com/wpcontent/uploads/sites/18/2016/03/Sportradar-Security-Services_Univsersity-of-Liverpool_AnEvaluation-of-the-FDS.pdf [https://perma.cc/5Y2P-H2AX].
326. Id. at 42–43. There is also a questionable relationship with law enforcement and the obligation to
report suspicious activity. Id. at 7–8.
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government agencies, such as the power to obtain search warrants
and conduct investigations where witnesses are under an obligation
to cooperate. The concept of trusting private organizations that lack
any authority to take action when they identify a potential indicator
of corruption is problematic for regulators who want to ensure that
there is an efficient system for deterring corruption.
Currently, federal laws such as the Sports Bribery Act,327 as well
as the patchwork of state laws addressing sport corruption, are
outdated and require updating to address modern criminal structures
and create a system that encourages individuals to come forward with
information through mechanisms such as whistleblower
protections.328 Despite relative silence from early state adopters and
delegation to operators on how to protect the integrity of sports, there
have been emergent calls from some congressional members to begin
reexamining federal laws on the issue and to implement some new
regulations that would bring uniformity into the system.329 Protecting
the integrity of both sports events and sportsbooks is critical to
ensure a properly functioning wagering market, as well as ensuring
resources are available for individuals experiencing problematic
gambling behaviors.
B. Public Health
Public health concerns associated with gambling are among the
most commonly cited reasons for prohibiting and limiting access to
gambling facilities and websites.330 Indeed, “problem gamblers” can
be a massive cost to society, especially when safeguards and
systematic protections fail to protect individuals.331 One study found
327. Sports Bribery Act, § 1(a), Pub. L. No. 88-316, 78 Stat. 203 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
224 (2012)).
328. See Holden & Rodenberg, supra note 321, at 471–73.
329. See Orrin G. Hatch, Sports Betting Is Inevitable–Let’s Make Sure It’s Done Right, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED (May 23, 2018), http://www.si.com/more-sports/2018/05/23/sports-betting-senator-orrinhatch-legislation [https://perma.cc/E583-G7AW].
330. Resource
Center,
STOP
PREDATORY
GAMBLING,
http://www.stoppredatorygambling.org/resource-center/?fwp_form=sports-betting
[https://perma.cc/D868-9KXY] (last visited Aug. 4, 2018).
331. Average Debt of Problem Gamblers in Wisconsin Exceeds $34,000, STOP PREDATORY
GAMBLING, http://www.stoppredatorygambling.org/average-debt-of-problem-gamblers-in-wisconsin-
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that by the time the average problem gambler seek help, he has
already amassed nearly $47,000 in gambling debt on average.332
Many gambling sites now include self-exclusion options where
bettors and, in some instances bettors’ loved ones, can get themselves
(or their loved ones) blocked from accessing brick and mortar casinos
or online sports betting sites; this is often viewed as a minimal level
protection.333 Self-exclusion protocols are not flawless and are likely
most effective for bettors who are at an advanced stage of being
ready to quit. Online websites can block internet protocol addresses,
but casinos face an added challenge of having to police self-excluders
and those who the casino wishes to exclude.334
The research on the efficacy of self-exclusion programs is mixed.
One of the major long-term studies, conducted in 2010, found that
while many self-excluders had a positive experience with the
program, more than half who tried to trespass at casinos were able to
do so.335 There is promise in self-exclusion programs; however, there
remains much to be learned about what makes programs
successful.336 There are a wide variety of disparities within selfexclusion programs, some which may make programs more or less
successful than others. States need to begin educating themselves on
the costs and benefits of government-based self-exclusion, which
effectively creates criminal or civil penalties for self-excluders who
trespass at casinos.337 Additionally, consideration needs to be given
exceeds-34000 [https://perma.cc/SH9F-WFRL] (last visited Aug. 4, 2018).
332. Andy Thompson, Average Debt for Compulsive Gamblers: $47,000, POST CRESCENT (Jan. 10,
2015, 3:49 PM), http://www.postcrescent.com/story/news/local/2015/01/10/average-debt-compulsivegamblers/21561693 [https://perma.cc/T24H-24R4].
333. Sean P. Murphy, Foxwoods Didn’t Stop Gambling Addict Who Asked to Be Banned–Until He
Won, BOS. GLOBE (Jan. 30, 2017), http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/01/29/banned-from-casinoreturns-lose-more-money-without-detection/pDuGgMVtU6xGlCjavXcfjL/story.html
[https://perma.cc/SFC4-97YF].
334. Alice Ross, Why Self-Exclusion Is Not an Answer to Problem Gambling, BUREAU
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (July 24, 2012), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2012-0724/why-self-exclusion-is-not-an-answer-to-problem-gambling [https://perma.cc/6Z39-ZS7L].
335. Sarah E. Nelson et al., One Decade of Self-Exclusion: Missouri Casino Self-Excluders Four to
Ten Years After Enrollment, 26 J. GAMBLING STUDIES 129, 129 (2010).
336. Research on Self-Exclusion Programs, NAT’L CTR. RESPONSIBLE GAMING (Aug. 2010),
http://www.ncrg.org/resources/publications/issues-insights/research-self-exclusion-programs
[https://perma.cc/5G5P-7FYB].
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to who should be held responsible if self-excluders gain access and
cause personal financial harm.338 Although self-exclusion has many
variables, it is a baseline protection that is necessary industry-wide.
There are, however, more advanced options that progressive state
legislatures could implement in the realm of online wagering that
may be more promising in identifying problem gamblers at an early
stage.
Many gambling sites collect large amounts of data regarding
patterns of play by users, which can be compared against other users
to determine which users might be exhibiting problem gambling
tendencies.339 Several of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders V’s criteria for problem-gambling signs could be
identified using data from online playing patterns, including
“[r]epeated unsuccessful efforts to control, cut back on or stop
gambling” and “[a]fter losing money gambling, often returning
[another day] to get even.”340 Using data to identify problemgamblers at an earlier stage and implement interventions to provide
assistance before the gambler incurs significant consequences would
be a meaningful advancement over what is currently being done in
brick-and-mortar casinos and in overseas markets with legal sports
betting.
In addition to age and identity verifications, which are fairly
commonplace in most gambling industries, the implementation of
impactful integrity provisions such as governmental oversight of
integrity monitoring and the use of data-based solutions to identify
problem gambling tendencies can make meaningful advances in the
United States sports betting market. Unfortunately, there has been an
early rush to beat competitors to the market in some regions of the
338. Peter Czegledy, The Legal Risk of Problem Gambling, 13 GAMING L. REV. & ECON. 233, 233
(2009); Neda Faregh & Craig Leth-Steensen, Reflections on the Voluntary Self-Exclusion of Gamblers
and the Law-Suits Against Ontario Lottery and Gaming Corporation, 25 J. GAMBLING STUD. 131, 131
(2009); NAT’L CTR. RESPONSIBLE GAMING, supra note 336.
339. Mark Griffiths, Internet Gambling: Issues, Concerns, and Recommendations, 6
CYBERPSYCHOLOGY & BEHAV. 557, 563, 566 (2003).
340. Philip Wang, What is Gambling Disorder?, AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N (Aug. 2018),
https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gambling-disorder/what-is-gambling-disorder
[https://perma.cc/7V7K-M54E].
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country, and consumer protection issues have been pushed to the
back burner.341 Although sports betting promises to bring new
revenue to the states, there is a risk that a system without checks and
balances could end up costing states more money in social costs than
they could ever generate in tax revenue.
CONCLUSION
In a report commissioned for the American Gaming Association,
Oxford Economics Group prepared an estimate of what the economic
impact of legalized sports betting might look like in the United
States.342 The report concluded that the total economic impact could
range from a little more than $10 billion annually to nearly $44
billion annually if sports betting was widely available across the
country.343 It is also hypothesized that in certain environments there
could be more than $300 billion wagered annually and legally in the
United States, which would rank sports betting as the fifteenth-largest
industry in the country. Three hundred billion dollars is roughly
equivalent to two percent of the country’s gross domestic product.344
Although the high-end estimates are likely overly rosy, many
lawmakers have seen the fall of PASPA as an opportunity to cure
state budget problems. But, legal sports betting is unlikely to be a
panacea in terms of the ills of state tax revenue shortfalls.345
The small margins within which betting operators have to generate
a profit make it difficult to implement taxes that would alleviate
341. Brian Hess, Letter to the Editor, As Legal Sports Betting Spreads, We Need Consumer
Protection, WASH. POST, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/as-legal-sports-betting-spreads-weneed-consumer-protection/2018/10/10/70ba2742-cb42-11e8-ad0a-0e01efba3cc1_story.html
[https://perma.cc/NE5T-BSSN] (last visited Oct. 19, 2018).
342. OXFORD ECONS., ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF LEGALIZED SPORTS BETTING 3 (2017),
http://www.americangaming.org/sites/default/files/AGA-Oxford%20%20Sports%20Betting%20Economic%20Impact%20Report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/4UV9-CNSA].
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deficits and allow operators to remain competitive with the illegal
market.346 The opportunity for states to legalize sports betting should
be viewed as an opportunity to give millions of Americans the ability
to do something legally that they were doing already. There certainly
are risks associated with sports betting, both legal and illegal, but the
legal market offers great advantages because lawmakers can mandate
standards to protect consumers, operators, and sports leagues. The
opportunity to make a risky behavior safer is what lawmakers should
embrace, and in many ways, legalization with proper implementation
designed around consumer protection may be able to achieve what
the federal government never could—a means of curbing the illegal
market.
The ability to legalize sports betting presents a tremendous
opportunity, but also a tremendous risk for states. Much can be
learned from the deliberate and careful approach to the legalization of
recreational marijuana in states like Oregon and Washington, which
have seen the growth of a now-booming industry.347 This type of
deliberate practice and attention to detail is what is necessary to
ensure that sports betting is a success as opposed to a mere fad that
will only temporarily serve as a substitute to the illegal market.
Legalized sports betting has great potential, but its success will be
measured in years, not in months.
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